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CHALLENGES TO ELECTION STRUCTURES:




The importance of black participation in the politics, black
leadership in the democratic process, and the contribution
blacks can make to urban solutions all become academic if black
hopes are cut off at the political pass by tactical devices. This is




When Mayor Hatcher wrote the above words, he was one of only
a handful of blacks occupying major elected positions in the United
States. In the years that followed, black political participation in-
creased visibily. The gains include a substantial increase in the
number of black elected officials, and a recognition of blacks as an
important interest group in national politics. Gone, ideally forever,
are the days of white primaries, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses.
Officially sanctioned racial restrictions on registration and balloting
have not been prevalent even in the Deep South for years.
However, access to the ballot does not always provide mean-
ingful political participation for blacks. Under certain circumstances,
the presence of the "tactical devices" assailed by Mayor Hatcher can
mean that even though blacks are allowed to register and vote, their
votes will have no impact on the outcome of election contests. These
devices are elements of the election structure and include at-large or
multi-member election districts, majority vote, post, and full-slate re-
quirements. With the exception of the latter, all of these devices
serve legitimate state goals. Nevertheless, their presence can mean
that the combined votes of even a substantial number of black
voters will be cancelled out or diluted. Lawsuits attacking election
systems that cancel out minority voting strength are called "dilution
suits."
On the same day of the 1980 term, the United States Supreme
Court handed down two decisions involving dilution claims. City of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Hatcher, The Black Role in Urban Politics, 57 CURRENT HIST. 287, 306 (1969).
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Mobile v. Bolden' involved a claim that Mobile's election structure
diluted black voting strength in violation of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendments. A plurality of the Court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that they were entitled to any relief. The plural-
ity opined that blacks who register, cast ballots, and run for office
without hindrance cannot claim a denial of the right to vote.3 Dilu-
tion, reasoned the plurality, is nothing more than a claim that blacks
have not achieved proportional representation. Since the constitu-
tion does not guarantee proportional representation to any group,'
the plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they establish that the dilution-
causing devices were selected for a discriminatory purpose.' Thus,
unlike Mayor Hatcher, the Constitution is concerned with blacks'
hopes being cut off at the political pass only if the ambush was
engineered with that in mind.
The Mobile plurality's narrow view of the scope of the constitu-
tionally protected right to vote stands in striking contrast to the
Court's view of the scope of protection provided by section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act." Section 5 prohibits certain covered political sub-
divisions from enacting election laws that have the purpose or effect
of denying the right to vote because of race. In City of Rome v.
United States, handed down with Mobile, the Court held that Rome,
Georgia could not adopt an election system very similar to Mobile's
because the system decreased the chances of electing a black candi-
date, thereby having the effect of denying the right to vote on ac-
count of race.' Mobile was distinguished not on the facts, but rather
on the basis of the different source for the claim. In Rome the Court
reasoned that Congress can provide protection for minority voting
rights beyond that provided by the constitution.' Because of the
remedial nature of section 5, Congress can prohibit the adoption of
election laws that affect blacks' chances for electing a candidate,
even though the laws would be constitutional unless enacted for a
discriminatory purpose.1
This article responds to the Supreme Court's treatment of mi-
nority entitlement and the right to vote in the dilution situation. It
2. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
3. Id. at 65.
4. Id at 76.
5. Id. at 66-67.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (c) (1980).
7. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
8. Id at 183-84.
9. Id at 173.
10. Id. at 173-78.
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rejects the dualistic definition of the right to vote inherent in
Mobile and Rome. Voting has the same functions and the same value
regardless of whether the source for its protection is constitutional
or statutory. Neither Mobile nor Rome gave proper consideration to
the role the right to vote plays in a democratic society. Thus, both
reached the wrong result.
For an individual voter, the value of the right to vote does not
come from being guaranteed a representative of one's own race. Nor
is the value always provided by being allowed to freely cast a ballot.
Rather the right to vote fulfills the function ascribed to it by Yick
Wo. v. Hopkins," "to preserve all other rights," when it provides
the voter with the means to participate in governmental and
societal decision making. The right to vote is meaningful when a
voter can join his vote with those of like-minded others in the pursuit
of common goals. Properly conceived, the dilution plaintiffs' claim is
that the election structure when superimposed upon racially
oriented politics produces a situation that deprives them of the
benefit of their numbers in the political process. They are thus
deprived of the value of voting."
Much of blacks' political gains of the last fifteen years can be at-
tributed to the most effective civil rights law ever passed, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.'" Not only did this Act guarantee blacks
access to the ballot, but the portion of the Act involved in Rome,
section 5, effectively prohibited the post-1965 adoption of election
laws that contributed to dilution. Section 5 becomes ineffective
August, 1982, unless Congress extends it. Expiration of section 5
will place the full burden of protection against dilution on the con-
stitution and the Act's permanent provisions. Congress will base its
decision about the extension of section 5 and also the stengthening
of the Act's other provisions upon an assessment of the prevalence
of dilution, and the adequacy of other remedies. This article pro-
vides that assessment.
Dilution suits are only the most recent attempt by blacks to gain
meaningful political participation. Part I of this article sets the
11. 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
12. The reader will have to be satisfied for the moment with this fairly vague
description of dilution. A large part of the problem with dilution suits, and perhaps the
cause of their possible demise as "voting" suits, has been the failure of all concerned to
adequately define dilution, and to explain why it results in the denial of the right to
vote. The portions of this article that trace the development of the dilution suit pre-
sent the definition as it evolved. Part V presents in detail the author's proposed
substitute.
13. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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stage for these claims by briefly recounting the earlier struggles of
blacks to gain access to the ballot. Part II explains how fully enfran-
chised blacks can be prevented from electing a candidate of their
choice, and then presents empirical data evidencing the degree to
which blacks are kept out of office by the election structure. Parts
III and IV examine blacks' attempts to have dilutive devices out-
lawed by tracing the development of the dilution suit from its
origins to its possible demise as a constitutional claim in Mobile.
Part V provides the elements missing from these attempts: a defini-
tion of dilution and an explanation of why it robs blacks of the value
of the right to vote. Recognizing that even questionable opinions of
the Supreme Court must be followed, Part VI examines the availa-
bility of a constitutional claim after Mobile and considers alter-
natives.
Two clarifications are in order at the outset. First, much of the
article focuses on the dilution. of black voting strength. However,
this emphasis is not to suggest that blacks are the only victims of
dilution and other types of voting discrimination. Other minorities
can be substituted where appropriate. Second, although this article
refers most often to municipalities when discussing election struc-
ture, everything said here is fully applicable to other local govern-
ment units such as counties and school boards.
(Vol. 42
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I. THE POLITICS OF DISFRANCHISEMENT




Until fairly recently, concern over the impact of election struc-
tures on black political participation was overshadowed by the far
more pressing problem of virtual disfranchisement of the black
population in much of the South. The history of blacks' frustrating
attempts to gain access to the ballot is admirably documented
elsewhere.' Thus, only a brief summary of that story will be re-
counted. Disfranchisement of blacks has been almost exclusively a
problem in the South. Before the fifteenth amendment, only six
states-all in the Northeast-allowed blacks to vote, but since 1870
very few incidences of denied access to the ballot have occurred out-
side the South.2
After ratification of the fifteenth amendment in 1870, Congress,
intending to make black suffrage a reality, promptly passed the En-
forcement Act of 1870.' The statute guaranteed the right to vote
regardless of race in all state and federal elections. In addition, the
Act made criminal the violation of state laws governing the election
of federal officers. Furthermore, the statute prohibited the interfer-
ence privately or officially with a citizen's right to vote, and the
commission of fraudulent acts in connection with registration and
balloting.'
Enforcement met with expected massive resistance. However,
1. See generally V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949): J.
KROUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS (1974); S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS,
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE; SOUTH 1944-1969 (1976); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF
SOUTHERN HISTORY (rev. ed. 1968); Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to
Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973).
2. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS (1932),
cited in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, VOTING (1961).
3. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. Earlier Congress had passed the Reconstruction Act of
1867, [ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867)], which Act provided, inter alia, that before a state
would be entitled to representation in Congress: (1) Negroes be admitted to suffrage
when elections for delegates to the state constitutional coventions were held; (2) the
new constitutions provide permanently for Negro voting; and (3) the fourteenth
amendment be ratified.
4. Ch. 114. §§ 19, 20, 16 Stat. 140. The Act was amended in 1871 to establish a
system of federal supervision for elections. Ch. 99, §§ 2-14, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
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the most debilitating blow to the effort was dealt by the Supreme
Court. In two 1876 opinions, United States v. Cruikshank and
United States v. Reese,' the Court effectively nullified the Enforce-
ment Act. These decisions, coupled with the Court's restrictive in-
terpretations of the Civil War amendments, 7 virtually dismantled
the federal machinery designed to protect Negro voting rights.
Although the defects in the statutory scheme were seemingly
correctable, the sympathetic Republicans lost control of Congress in
1875 and were not to regain it until near the end of the century. The
Compromise of 1877 removed the remaining federal troops from the
South. Any surviving Republican governments were soon toppled
and Reconstruction was over. Federal involvement in civil rights
was to be ended for nearly 80 years, and white Southerners began
the unfettered, systematic elimination of blacks as a political,
economic, or social force in the South.
White citizens' dissatisfaction with the corruption surrounding
southern elections led to a search for a "permanent" solution to
replace the fraud and election day chicanery being employed to
eliminate black influences.' Starting with Mississippi in 1890, virtual-
ly all the southern states adopted constitutional provisions requiring
literacy tests and the payment of poll taxes as prerequisites of voting.,
5. 94 U.S. 542 (1896). In Cruikshank, three men who were part of a mob that had
murdered a group of blacks in Louisiana were convicted of conspiring to hinder
citizens in their enjoyment of rights guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress could only protect the right to
vote in federal elections and the right to be free of racial discrimination. Since neither
right was asserted in the indictment no offense was stated.
6. 92 U.S. 214 (1876). In Reese, two Kentucky election "inspectors" were con-
victed for refusing to receive a black man's vote. The Supreme Court voided the sec-
tions of the Enforcement Act under which the convictions were obtained because they
could be read as applying to cases not based on race.
7. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
394, 16 Wall. 394 (1883).
8. An additional motivation for change was fear that the federal government,
again controlled by Republicans, might renew its efforts to protect the black vote. This
fear heightened when in 1890 Senator Lodge introduced a bill to extend the federal
Supervisory Act of 1870 to provide scrutiny over every phase of the election process,
thus potentially exposing the widespread fraud. The measure was narrowly defeated.
J. KROUSSER, supra note 1, at 29-30.
9. The literacy test required an applicant for registration to read and write any
section of the state or federal Constitution. To avoid disfranchising illiterate whites,
some states provided alternative means of qualifying. Most popular were "the under-
standing test," the "grandfather" and "fighting grandfather" clause, "good character
tests," and the property ownership exception. Literacy tests were not confined to the
South. Between 1889 and 1913, nine nonsouthern states made the ability to read
English a qualification for voting. Id at 57.
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These devices resulted in the immediate, nearly total disfranchise-
ment of blacks in the South. If administered fairly these devices still
left open the possibility that blacks might ultimtely qualify to vote
in threatening numbers. However, the other main vehicle for main-
taining white supremacy-the all white primary-eliminated the
possibility that, even if registered, blacks could cast a meaningful
vote. The forces that produced the one party system in the South
were more complicated than simply the desire to maintain white
supremacy," but for whatever reason, by the end of the nineteenth
century the politics of the South had become the politics of the
Democratic party. Thus, excluding blacks from the Democratic
primary eliminated them from the only genuine political contest."
Elimination of blacks from the political process in the South was
accompanied by the Supreme Court's approval of segregation in
Plessy v. Ferguson.2 The adoption of the so-called Jim Crow laws
soon followed, whereby "separate, and clearly not equal" became the
law in every phase of southern life from the cradle to the grave.'3
Shortly before Plessy, Congress had indicated its lack of interest in
the matter by repealing most of the Reconstruction statutes and ex-
pressing the view: "Let the States of the great Union understand
that elections are in their hands, and if there be fraud, coercion, or
force used they will be the first to feel it.""
Efforts to attack the disfranchising schemes on constitutional
grounds were rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the
poll tax in 1937,'" the white primary not mandated by state law in
1935,6 and the literacy test as late as 1959."T It outlawed only the
grandfather clause, 8 and state mandated all-white primaries."
10. See generally i&, and the sources cited therein.
11. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 35 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as CRC REPORT 19591.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. See generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed.
1966).
14. H.R. REP. No. 18, 53d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1893). Many of the remaining acts
were repealed in 1909. Ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909). The sole remaining statute, section
1 of the Enforcement Act, is codified today as Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1)
(1979). Derfner, supra note 1, at 526.
15. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
16. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
17. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
18. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S 347 (1915). A replacement for the statute
struck down in Guinn was held to violate the fifteenth amendment in Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939). In was in Lane that Justice Frankfurter penned his frequently
quoted phrase, "The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
modes of discrimination." Id. at 275.
19. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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The first signal that the judicial tide might be turning came in
1941 in United States v. Classic.0 In that case, the Court, overruling
an earlier decision," held that the primary election was an integral
part of the procedure of choice and thus the Enforcement Act of
1870 protected registered Democrats from being deprived of their
vote in the Congressional primary. Only a short step from Classic to
the elimination of the white primary in Smith v. Allwright 22 four
years later was necessary to extend the fifteenth amendment's pro-
tection to the only meaningful southern election. Efforts to evade
the ruling by erasing all primary election statutes from the books
were also thwarted. 23 The final demise of the white primary came in
1953 in Terry v. Adams" when the Court held that an all white pre-
primary conducted by a "private" club unconstitutionally deprived
blacks of the right to vote.
When easy evasion of Smith could not be accomplished, white
supremacists' efforts were channelled to discriminatory application
of complex registration requirements .2 Typical of this form of dis-
crimination were registration laws providing for "understanding and
intrepretation tests," "good citizenship qualifications," "identifica-
tion requirements" and "no application form tests," all vesting unfet-
tered discretion in the hands of local registrars. In addition, these
officials frequently added their own informal obstacles.28
Responding to the pressure from civil rights groups, and to the
national attention received by heightened efforts in the South to
maintain the segregated way of life in the wake of Brown v. Board
of Education, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957." The Act,
20. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
21. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1880), the Court recognized that Congress had the authority to protect one's right to
vote in federal elections but the Court ruled in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232 (1921). that primaries were not part of the electoral process.
22. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
23. See Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C.). aff'd, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
24. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
25. Details and case studies of the era can be found in Note, Federal Protection
of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1965) [hereinafater cited as Negro
Voting).
26. Popular devices were slow-downs, where blacks had to stand in long lines for
many hours, or could only register one at a time. The registrar would not make his
hours public, or blacks arriving to register would often find the office closed.
Registrars might also withhold notification of rejection from applicants until time pass-
ed for appeal. See cases cited in Negro Voting, supra note 25, at 1079.
27. Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71 Stat. 634.
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inter alia, reiterated the declaration from the Enforcement Act of
1870 that all qualified citizens shall be allowed to vote in all elec-
tions regardless of race," and provided authority for the Attorney
General to institute voting rights suits to secure injunctive relief. n
The Civil Rights Act of 196030 added new remedies but after four
years and many frustrating law suits, the inadequacy of litigation
alone became apparent. The most glaring evidence of this deficiency
was the negligible gain in registration in the three states where
most of the successful suits had been brought. The increase in the
percentage of the black voting age population registered was as
follows: Alabama, from 10.2 percent in 1958 to 19.4 percent in 1964;
Louisiana from 31.7 percent in 1956 to 31.8 percent in 1965; and
Mississippi from 4.4 percent in 1954 to 6.4 percent in 1964.1'
B. A New Era: The Voting Rights Act of 1965
In response to this history of endless litigation, of one form of
discrimination being outlawed only to be replaced by another, Con-
gress in the Voting Rights Act of 19652 undertook to involve the
federal government in the very fabric of the political process in the
South. Congress responded to the failure of litigation by legislative-
ly determining the discriminatory effect of the most egregious of
the disfranchising devices, and providing for their automatic suspen-
sion.3 Although existing judicial remedies were strengthened, 4 the
innovative portions of the Act-those designed to regulate registra-
tion and voting-were drafted to operate with federal administra-
tive, rather than judicial, intervention.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86. For background see D. BERMAN, A BILL
BECOMES A LAW (2d ed. 1966).
31. Registration of voting age whites ran roughly fifty percent ahead of blacks.
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
32. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
33. Interestingly, Congress did not prohibit the poll tax outright. Instead it
directed the Attorney General to sue to invalidate the poll tax as a precondition to
voting. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a)(b) (1976). The twenty-fourth amendment abolished the poll
tax for federal elections, and the Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966), held that the imposition of the poll tax as a prerequisite
to voting in state elections violated due process.
34. The Act proscribes private action to intimidate voters in federal or state elec-
tions, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (1976); provides criminal sanctions for violations, 42 U.S.C. §
1973j(a) (1976); and provides civil remedies at the initiation of the Attorney General, 42
U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1976).
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The heart of the Act, the coverage formula known as the trigger,
determines the jurisdictions to be subjected to the more stringent
provisions of the Act. These provisions apply in any state or part of
a state which maintained a "test or device" in 1964 and which in
that year had either a voter registration or a voter turn-out in the
presidential election of less than fifty percent of the voting age
population."5 In the covered jurisdictions the following provisions ap-
ply: (1) All literacy tests are suspended;"6 (2) To avoid future at-
tempts to evade the Act, a very important provision, section 5,
"froze" election laws as of November 1, 1964. No change in election
practice or procedure can be implemented until federally precleared
(either by the Attorney General or the District of Columbia District
Court). Preclearence is to be given only if the jurisdiction can
demonstrate that the change is not racially discriminatory in pur-
pose or effect; 7 (3) Federal examiners may register qualified voters
for local elections if local registrars are not complying with the
Act;8 and, (4) the Attorney General may in an appropriate situation,
designate federal personnel to observe the entire election process. 9
35. 42 U.S.C. Section 1973(b) (1976). The covered jurisdictions were the states of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia, forty counties
in North Carolina, and a smattering of counties in non-southern areas. The determina-
tion of the existence of a "test or device" is made by the Attorney General, and the
Director of the Census determines the voting and registration figures.
36. The ban was initially for five years. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(a) (1976) [Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437 (1965)]. It was extended to ten years in 1970, 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b)(a) (1970) [Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314 (1970)] and applied nationwide for
the following five years (Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 315 (1970)). 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa (1970). It was made permanent in 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 102, 89 Stat. 400
(1975), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(a) (1976).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1976). This preclearance provision, discussed in detail in
Part V, is based on the freezing doctrine, developed by the judges of the Fifth Circuit
in voting cases under the earlier statutes. "Freezing" involves the suspension of state
voting qualifications so that blacks can be registered under the old standards under
which whites had been registered. An excellent discussion of those cases, and others
from which the wisdom was gleaned for the Voting Rights Act's special provision is
found in Negro Voting, supra note 25, at 1137-49.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-e (1976). As of 1974, seventy-three counties had been
designated as examiner counties. Approximately 319 examiners were utilized. Exten-
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S.407, S.903, S.1297, S.1409, and
S.1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 535 (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant At-
torney General, Civil Rights Division) [hereinafter cited as Pottinger].
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(f) (1976). From 1966 to 1974, 7,823 observers were utilized in
81 elections in 5 states. Pottinger, supra note 38.
All of these special provisions can be applied to noncovered jurisdictions on a tradi-
tional case-by-case basis. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1976).
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The stringent provisions of the Act were held constitutional in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,0 and by 1968 the effect on black
registration was already phenomenal. By that year, the following
percentage of voting age blacks were registered in the covered
states: Alabama 56.7 percent; Georgia 56.1 percent; Louisiana 59.3
percent; Mississippi 59.4 percent; North Carolina 55.3 percent; South
Carolina 50.8 percent; and Virginia 58.4 percent.'
In 1968 the Civil Rights Commission reported on it investigation
into whether new strategies had been devised to evade the Voting
Rights Act and to hinder black political participation. 2 The report
notes that except in Mississippi, a massive resistance program
similar to the southern reaction to Brown v. Board of Education had
not occurred. However, the Commission did note many instances of
practices and devices being adopted to dilute the black vote. Among
those mentioned were: (1) the adoption of at-large elections to avoid
the'election of blacks from majority black wards; (2) consolidation of
majority black counties with majority white counties in legislative
districting plans and other forms of gerrymandering; (3) adoption or
enforcement of full slate requirements." In addition, other commen-
tators noted the adoption of majority vote requirements, numbered
posts, and staggered terms, all of which prevent blacks from taking
advantage of white vote splitting to elect a black candidate."
40. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
41. VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT, VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE SOUTH (Summer,
1968). cited in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1970). White registration rates ran
from nine percentage points ahead in Virginia to thirty-three points in Mississippi.
42. A REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1968).
43. Id. at 171-74. The report summarizes other problems of the era. The Commis-
sion received complaints against the following measures which had the purpose or ef-
fect of preventing Negroes from obtaining office: (a) abolishing the office sought by
the Negro candidate (b) extending the terms of white incumbent office holders;
(c) raising the filing fee for offices for which Negroes were expected to run; (d) other-
wise increasing the requirements for getting on the ballot; (e) making elective offices
appointive; (f) withholding information from would-be Negro candidates about filing,
etc.; (g) refusing to certify nominating petitions for Negro candidates; (h) imposing
barriers to assumption of office by successful candidates. Discrimination against Negro
registrants took the following form: (a) preventing Negroes from attending party
precinct meetings and conventions; (b) omitting the names of registered Negroes from
the voter lists; (c) failing to provide adequate voting facilities in areas where registra-
tion had increased; (d) harassing Negro voters; (e) refusing to provide or permit
assistance to illiterate Negro voters; (f) giving inadequate or erroneous voting instruc-
tions; (g) disqualifying Negro ballots on technical grounds; (h) establishing polling
places in areas where Negroes were reluctant to go; (i maintaining racially segregated
voting facilities and voting lists. Id. at 172-73.
44. See, e.g., Derfner, supra note 1, at 553-55.
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The adoption of these devices after November 1, 1964, seeming-
ly should have been prevented by section 5 (the preclearance provi-
sion) of the Voting Rights Act. However, section 5 was virtually ig-
nored by the Department of Justice 5 until 1969 when the Supreme
Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections," established two impor-
tant aspects of section 5. First, the Court determined that the provi-
sion requires the submission of every change affecting voting in
even a minor way-specifically including redistricting. 7 Second, the
Court held that private citizens can sue to enjoin unprecleared
changes.8
Enforcement of section 5 began in earnest in 1970, and by 1975
the interposition of 163 objections by the Attorney General prevent-
ed the implementation of approximately 300 election law changes.'"
In addition to objections made to the practices and devices mention-
ed above, objections have been interposed to annexation bringing
additional white voters into at-large election systems, to changes
making election offices appointed, and to additions of residency re-
quirements.50
The primacy focus of literature on the political participation of
racial and ethnic minorities has been upon blacks in the South.
Although no other group of Americans share the blacks' heritage of
slavery, other distinctive ethnic minorities, most notably Mexican
Americans and American Indians, have as a group been subjected to
similar patterns of exclusion, oppression, and discrimination. Recog-
nizing that other minorities have also been victims of discrimination
in voting, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act of 1975 to ex-
tend the coverage of the special provisions to areas having high con-
centrations of certain "language minorities.""
45. See D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA 192 (1978).
46. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
47. Id. at 566.
48. Id. at 554-57.
49. Pottinger, supra note 38, at 582.
50. Id. at 598-600.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1976). The 1975 amendments extended section 5
for an additional seven years and added new parts of the country to the coverage of
the special sections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3) (1976). The 1975 Act is discussed in Hunter,
The 1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities, 25 CATH. U. L. R. 250 (1976).
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II. IS THE BALLOT ENOUGH: THE IMPACT OF ELECTION
STRUCTURE ON THE ELECTION OF BLACKS TO
MUNICIPAL OFFICE
"Some circumstantial evidence is very strong; as when
you find a trout in the milk."
Henry David Thoreau
Although discrimination in registration and balloting is largely a
practice of the past, access to to the ballot has not erased over 100
years of racial discrimination in the electoral process. Political suc-
cess depends upon more than simply the ability to cast a ballot. The
degree to which access to the ballot has carried with it the "ability
to preserve all other things" is not measured easily. One barometer
of whether blacks have achieved at least an intermediate goal-that
of political participation -is the number of black elected officials.
Although the gains since passage to the Voting Rights Act are im-
pressive, 2 blacks, who are 11.87 percent of the nation's population,
account for only 1 percent of the nation's elected officials.53 This sec-
tion considers the extent to which blacks' lack of proportionality
among black officials can be attributed to impediments in the elec-
tion structure.
The election structure consists of the unit of election, plus the
devices which determine the percentage of the unit's vote needed
for election. For local government, such as municipalities, school
boards, and counties, the election unit is either the entire political
subdivision (elections are said to be "at-large")54 or some segment of
52. A recent compilation indicated 4,912 black officials in the country in 1980, 18
times the number serving in 1964. 10 JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, NATIONAL
ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS 1 (1980).
53. Id. at 1, 9. There are no black United States senators, and only 17 represen-
tatives, none elected from a state in the Deep South. In state government, blacks hold
4.2 percent of the legislative seats across the nation. In Georgia, Mississippi, and
South Carolina where the population is more than 25 percent black, less than 10 per-
cent of the legislators are black. Furthermore, blacks hold only 1.7 percent of all
municipal offices nationally, and a substantial number of these officeholders are from
small, predominantly black towns. Id. at 9.
54. At-large elections on a local level are often analogized to a state multi-member
legislative district, from which more than one legislator is elected by all the voters of the
district. In terms of the potential within the district for submerging minority voting
strength, the system is equivalent to an at-large method of election for city govern-
ment, but the consequences for the representation of minority interests in the
legislature may note be as severe. For example, blacks may be a numerical minority of
one multi-member district, and as a consequence lose all the seats, but a majority in a
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it (elections are said to be by "wards" or districts).,5 The impact of
the choice of election unit on the election of black candidates will be
considered below, but first the operation of the other significant
elements of the election structure-the devices that determine the
percentage of the vote needed for election-must be explained.
A. The Operation of the Percentage-Determining Factors
When voting follows along racial lines a black candidate's
chances for success depend upon whether the black percentage of
votes in the election unit exceeds the number needed for election.
Regardless of whether elections are conducted "at-large" or by
"wards," the operation of the percentage-determining devices is the
same. The impact decreases, however, as blacks approach a majority
of the election unit, which is more likely in the smaller "district"
unit.5"
The percentage of the vote needed for election is determined by
the following factors: (1) whether in order to be elected a candidate
must receive a majority or a plurality of the votes cast; (2) whether
there is a "post" requirement (this provision requires each candidate
to run for a specific, designated position on the governing board,
rather than requiring all candidates to run against all other candi-
dates with the winners declared from the field);"7 (3) whether there
is a "full slate" (anti-single shot) requirement (this provision
operates only where there is no post requirement, and requires each
voter to mark his ballot for the same number of candidates as there
are offices to be elected).8
multi-member district elsewhere in the state (or for that matter in several single
member districts) and elect all the seats. Thus black "numerical" representation may
even out for the state as a whole. In municipal government where the entire city is the
electoral and the representational unit, the loss is total.
55. Typically, one municipal legislative office is elected from each district in the
city. Having two or more offices elected per district is not uncommon.
56. Because of segregated housing patterns some districts almost inevitably have
a higher concentration of blacks than the city as a whole.
57. The post requirement is often called a "place", "position" or "numbered seat"
rule. Providing for "staggered terms" can have a similar effect if only one office is
elected in any given election. Sometimes the posts are connected with a residency re-
quirement, which again produces a one-on-one election situation but is somewhat more
advantageous to blacks. If the residential districts conform to the segregated housing
pattern, potential white candidates may be scarce in predominantly black residential
districts.
58. For example, if four council positions are to be filled from a field of sixteen
candidates, only ballots marked for exactly four candidates will be counted.
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The following hypothetical illustrates the impact on the election
of black candidates of the various combinations of percentage-deter-
mining elements where voting is along racial lines. The situation
contemplates a city with 1000 voters, 40 percent of whom are black,
electing four at-large representatives.
1. Majority Vote Required/Offices Elected by Posts. The post
requirement makes each office a separate election. Thus candidates
in the hypothetical city file for positions one, two, three or four.
Since a majority is required for election, 501 votes are needed. To
be successful, a black candidate would have to receive all the black
votes and at least 101 white votes. The number of opponents is im-
material. The majority vote requirement allows whites to campaign
among themselves without fear that blacks can take advantage of a
split in their ranks. Once this battle is over, a single white candidate
emerges for a runoff with the black, and the whites unite to sup-
port the white candidate."
2. Majority Vote Required/No Post Designation/No Full Slate
(anti-single shot) Requirement. The four offices in this situation are
filled from a field of candidates. In the hypothetical election some
numbers of candidates run for the four offices, and the top four to
receive a majority are elected. A voter may vote for fewer than four
candidates" and fewer votes will be needed to equal a majority if
some voters vote for fewer than 4 candidates. Theoretically the 400
black votes can constitute a majority. Consider the following situa-
tion:
1 Black candidate 400 votes (all blacks vote only for this
candidate)
12 White candidates 200 votes (whites spread their 4 votes
evenly among the white
candidates)
A majority is calculated by totaling the votes cast and dividing
by twice the number of offices and adding 1:
2400 + 1 = 351.
2x4
59. This does not mean that white voters are intentionally voting against the
black candidate. The majority of whites may simply be oblivious to the presence of a
black on thd ballot. If the black makes the runoff, whites may take more interest.
60. The majority vote requirement eliminates any advantage to running a full
slate. The 400 black votes may be sufficient for all four blacks to make the run-off, but
their opponents will be the top four vote-getters among the white candidates. Whites
unite in support of the white candidates, all of whom win. The better strategy is to run
less than a full slate and vote only for the black candidates.
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The black candidate would be elected on the first ballot. Neverthe-
less, even in the hypothetical, blacks who are 40 percent of the elec-
troate must sacrifice three-quarters of their votes to elect possibly
only slightly more than half their numerical proportion of the seats.
Their other choice is not to run any black candidates and instead
provide the margin of victory for some of the white candidates.
3. Majority Vote Required/No Posts/Full State (anti-single shol)
Rule in Effect. This situation is identical to example 2 except that
only those ballots marked for four candidates are counted. Under
this arrangement, blacks cannot elect a candidate without white sup-
port. Moreover, unless blacks can run a full slate of four candidates,
they must cast some votes against the black candidates to have
their ballots counted. Therefore a black victory is impossible. For
example, assume that two blacks and six whites reach the runoff
election:
2 Black candidates 400 votes each
6 White candidates 400 votes each (600 white voters x 4
votes each, divided by 6 candidates)
The remaining 800 votes that the blacks must cast to have their
ballot count assure that all the winners will be white.
4. Plurality Vote/Post Requirement. In this situation the
chances of electing a black without white support depend on the
number of white candidates.
Post #1: 1 Black vs. 1 White 501 votes are needed
Post #2:1 Black vs. 2 Whites black can be elected without
white support if whites split their
vote evenly
As the number of white opponents increases, the chance for 400
black votes to equal a plurality also increases.
5. Plurality Vote/No Post/Full Slate (anti-single shot) Require-
ment. This situation is similar to example 3, except that only a
plurality is required. The possibility of electing four blacks, like that
in example 4, depends upon the number of white opponents.
If blacks are unable to field a full slate of four candidates, elec-
tion of a smaller number of blacks becomes unlikely without either
white support or careful strategy. Consider:
2 Black candidates 400 votes each
8 White candidates 300 votes each plus each black has two ad-
ditional votes which must be cast. If they
also bloc vote for two specific white candi-
[Vol. 4,2
VOTE DILUTION
dates, then the two blacks may be among
the top four. Again, this strategy depends
upon a fairly even split of white vote, plus
careful coordination of the black vote.
As the total number of candidates decreases, the number of white
votes needed for the election of a black increases. Blacks, less likely
than whites to field a full slate, are forced to vote against their can-
didate, but whites are not. Even if blacks are a majority of those
voting, they must field a full slate to avoid being defeated by the re-
quirement."'
6. Plurality Vote/No Post/No Full Slate Requirement. This com-
bination increases blacks' chances of electing one or more blacks
even with fewer than four candidates, if black voters forego their
privilege to cast four ballots. For example:
1 Black candidate 400 votes (blacks vote only for the black
candidate)
8 White candidates 300 votes each
The likelihood of success improves with increasing numbers of
white candidates, but any black "strategy" can be defeated by a
limitation of white candidates to the number of offices to be filled.
Another very important factor in determining the success of
black candidates is whether elections are conducted on a partisan or
non-partisan basis. The influence of a genuine two-party system may
override the other elements of the election structure. Ostensibly,
partisan politics increases the possibility that one or both parties
will support a black as a part of their slate of candidates to secure
the bloc of black votes for other party candidates. Only if elections
are non-partisan or are dominated by one party can racial bloc
voting safely exist, thus allowing the election structure to exclude
black votes.
B. The Unit of Election: At-Large vs. District Elections, A
Descriptive Study
Although courts have criticized all of the percentage-determin-
ing elements because of their impact on the election of minority can-
61. The antidemocratic nature of the full slate requirement was noted by the
court in Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206, 212 (E.D.N.C. 1972):
We are inclined to believe that the right to vote includes the right of the voter to
refuse to vote for someone he does not know, may not agree with, or may believe
to be a fool, and under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, we doubt that
the state may constitutionally compel a voter to vote for a candidate of another
race or political philosophy in order to get his vote counted.
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didates, 2 apparently only the full slate requirement has been the
subject of a constitutional suit."3 Nor has the impact of these devices
received much attention in the political science literature." How..
ever, the election unit (frequently called the "method of election")
has received considerable attention.
If blacks are a majority of the electoral unit, then the remaining
elements of the electoral structure are less important." Because
blacks are not a majority of the voting age population in many
American cities, when elections are conducted at-large a black candi..
date must receive white support to be elected. When a city is divid..
ed into wards or districts, some districts can be expected to have a
black majority or at least a greater proportion of black residents
than the city as a whole. Not surprisingly then, most studies of the
two systems find that more blacks are elected to city councils when
all or some of the seats are elected by districts,"
62. See the discussion of the requirements as "enhancing factors" in dilution suits
in Part l11, infR. All of these devices have been denied preclearance under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. See Pottinger, supra note 38, at 581.
63. The Alabama full slate provision was found to be constitutional in Alsup v.
Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ala. 1962). In Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 1975
(S.C. 1964), affd, 379 U.S. 15 (1964), the Court upheld the South Carolina requirement
on the grounds that dilution was not inevitable-voters could "write in" a full slate,
and the state had a legitimate interest in full participation by the electorate. The
statute in Boineau was subsequently overturned in Stevenson v. West, C.A. 72-45 (So.
Car. App. 1972), in which the court concluded that the provision could not withstand
the strict scrutiny required by recent cases and all legitimate state interests could be
achieved by using posts instead. See also Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C.
1972) (full slate requirement overturned); Amedee v. Fowler, 275 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. La.
1967) (anti-single shot statute upheld). Some jurisdictions in which the requirement
was upheld dropped it or replaced it with numbered posts, leaving Mississippi as the
only state where the requirement is mandated by statewide legislation. Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 21-11-15 (1972).
64. But see, Cotrell, The Effects of At-Large Elections on the Political Access
and Voting Strength of Mexican-Americans and Blacks in Texas, published in the 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 501. See also D. HUNTER, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT
128 (1972) and YOUNG, THE PLACE SYSTEM IN TEXAS ELECTIONS (Austin, Texas In-
stitute of Public Affairs, 1965). referred to in Cotrell, supra, at 498. Hunter notes that
electoral results in North Carolina in 1968 and 1970 reflect the impact of the numbered
post requirements and the anti-single shot law. Fifty-six percent of the blacks in elec-
tion contests not covered by either requirement were victorious, but only thirteen per-
cent of those in contests where one or the other device was in effect were successful.
D. HUNTER, supra, at 128.
65. To the extent that a black majority bloc votes against whites, the results of
the foregoing hypothetical are somewhat reversed, but whites in a minority situation
are seldom disadvantaged to the same degree as are blacks.
66. See, e.g., Latimer, Black Political Representation in Southern Cities, 15 URII.
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While blacks are generally numerically under-represented re-
gardless of the method of election," most studies have concluded
that they are more under-represented in at-large cities.8 An early,
comprehensive study of the impact of the election structure report-
ed that in 1972 blacks received only 46 precent of their numerical
representation in at-large cities, compared with 77 percent in dis-
trict cities. 9 (Blacks have 100 percent of their numerical representa-
tion or "proportional representation" when the precentage of blacks
elected to the governing board equals the black percentage of the city.)
Comparable findings were reported in a 1976 study. 0 A comparison
of regional studies reveals that the impact of the election structure
is stronger in those areas with a history of racial prejudice. For ex-
ample, a 1977 study of municipalities in the Deep South found the
average black representation ratio to be .68 in district cities and .18
in at-large cities"1 (1.0 is equal to proportional representation). In
contrast a 1974 study of New Jersey municipalities concluded that
the election structure was not an important variable in black can-
didate success."
AFF. Q. 65 (1979). The drawing of the district lines determines the percentage of blacks
in each district. Black voting strength can be diffused by splitting black neighborhoods
into several districts, thus keeping any district from having a majority black elec-
torate. Alternatively, the number of candidates blacks can potentially elect can be
decreased by "packing" as many blacks as possible into a few districts, thus eliminating
their influence in other districts.
67. In cities where racial bloc voting is extreme, blacks are unlikely to achieve
.proportional" representation even with district elections. In highly residentially
segregated cities, gerrymandering to create enough predominantly black districts to
afford proportional representation would require careful manipulation of the ward
lines.
68. It is generally accepted that at-large election systems were not adopted initial-
ly for the purpose of excluding black officeholders. Over half of the cities in the United
States emply at-large elections. INTL CITY MANAGEMENT ASs-N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR-
BOOK 99 (1979). This method of election had generally been associated with the "reform
movement" in municipal government. Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-
Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 85, 92 (1979).
69. Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of District Elec-
tions and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 233, 229 (1976).
70. Robinson & Dye, Reforming and Black Representation on City Councils, 59
Soc. Sci. Q. 133 (1978). This study is also reported in Berry & Dye, supra note 68, at
85. See also Engstrom & McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councik Clarifying
the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on The Seat/Population Relationship, 75 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 344 (1981); Taebel, Minority Representation on City Councils: The Im-
pact of Structure on Blacks and Hispanics, 59 Soc. ScI. Q. 142 (1978).
71. Latimer, supra note 66, at 65. 72.
72. Cole, Electing Blacks to Municipal Office: Structure and Social Determinants,
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All of the above studies are based upon some notion of "propor-
tional numerical representation." Finding a difference in the degree
of proportionality depending upon the method of election suggests
the obvious: more blacks are elected in ward cities because there
they need little or no white support. Proportional representation is
a useful tool for comparative analysis, but the meaning of finding a
lack of proportionality, regardless of election structure, is not en-
tirely clear. Even in ward cities, drawing districts that would pro-
duce proportional representation without deliberate gerrymandering
may not be feasible. Moreover, regardless of the election structure
or the attitudes of the white electorate, the black community may
not produce a proportional number of candidates with characteris-
tics, race aside, that correlate highly with success at the polls. Thus
numerical underrepresentation, for the present time, seems inevit-
able.
Recognizing the inability to place a meaningful interpretation on
the finding of lack of proportionality, the author undertook a dif-
ferent kind of study. This study examined the nation's municipalities
to discover whether the election of any substantial number of cur-
rent black office holders has taken place under circumstances sug-
gestive of white support. Contributions by whites to the election of
significant numbers of black officials, regardless of proportionality,
is some indication that a black candidate's race is not an absolute
barrier to election. If the election of blacks is widespread, perhaps
the absence of proportionality is better explained by circumstances
other than the racial attitudes of the electorate. Conversely, the per-
vasive absence of black elected officials in municipalities with
substantial black populations suggests the racial attitudes of the
electorate as the most logical causative factor.
Much has been made of blacks' political gains since 1965. A re-
cent news article noted that the number of municipal black officials
10 URB. AFF. Q. 17-39 (1974). Berry & Dye, supra note 68, found, contrary to other
studies, that the northeast regions produced higher black underrepresentation than
even the South. ld. at 113-20. This difference may be explained on the basis of the sam-
ple chosen and the states placed in the "southern" region. The study undertaken for
this article indicates that of the twenty-one cities in the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) with populations in excess of 50,000 at least
fifteen percent black (1980 preliminary census data), thirteen have ward elections and
thus are more "proportionally representative." Two of the at-large cities are majority
black. Of the six remaining at-large cities, only one has even a single black elected of-
ficial. Data on file with author.
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has tripled in the past ten years." One researcher optimistically
noted that "black candidates have received white support in all sec-
tions of the country and in a variety of electoral systems.... White
voters, previously skeptical, now have less hesitancy to vote for
blacks. Heightened black political consciousness joined by increased
white tolerance have become keys to contemporary black electoral
success."
74
Evaluation of these contentions required examination of the
kinds of municipalities in which blacks currently hold municipal of-
fice. This examination was undertaken with two questions in mind:
Is the election 'of blacks to municipal office widespread? If so, can
the prevalence of black office holders be attributed to white support
for their candidacy? A complete breakdown of electing municipali-
ties by region, population, and percentage black is found in Table A
in the Appendix."5 Blacks apparently are being elected in municipali-
ties from all regions of the country, of all sizes, and with full per-
centage range of black populations. In the West and Central regions
the electing cities are larger and have smaller black populations
than those in the South.71 Those differences, however, may be largely
demographic.
Existence of a white majority in nearly three-quarters of all the
electing municipalities suggests whites are contributing to the elec-
tion of blacks, although the magnitude of the contribution cannot be
determined without additional information about the election struc-
ture. Outside the Voting Rights Act states, the existence of an elec-
tion structure favorable to blacks is itself an indication of whites'
political tolerance, since the majority controls the selection of the
structure."
73. "Blacks and Politics: Steady Gain in a Decade of Disappointment," N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1978, § A, at 12, col. 5.
74. Cole, Comments on 'Black Representation,' 12 URB. AFF. Q. 243, 247 (1976).
75. The municipalities having at least one current black office holder were deter-
mined primarily from the NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS supra note
52, although a few additional cities were discovered through phone surveys conducted
in June through September, 1981. The population and black percentage for the
municipalities are those reported in the Preliminary 1980 Census Reports. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING:
PRELIMINARY REPORTS (1980).
76. The nation's municipalities were placed into five regions for purposes of the
compilation. The regions are West, Central, Northeast, Border and South. The states
contained in each region are set out in the Appendix.
77. In the Voting Rights Act states, changes in the election structure are
monitored by the Attorney Geneal under section 5. Therefore, less benevolence can be
attributed to the majority by the absence of obstacles in the South.
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Table B of the Appendix presents the number of electing and
non-electing municipalities by region for all municipalities of at least
5,000 with black populations of at least 20 percent. Regional dif-
ferences appear that are not explainable by demographics. Only 21
percent of the Central, 23 percent of the Northeast and 25 percent
of the West regions' cities are currently without a black elected of-
ficial. But in the South and Border regions the percentages increase
to 43 percent and 41 precent respectively." The regional differences
cannot be solely attributed to the prevalence of ward elections out-
side the South; a majority of all municipalities conduct at-large elec-
tions.7
Despite marked regional differences, blacks are being elected in
majority white cities even in the South. A further examination was
undertaken of the municipalities of four Deep South states -Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Alabama-to determine
whether inter-state and intra-state differences could be explained."
The table below shows the number of electing and non-electing
municipalities by states.
Municipalities with Populations of 5,000 or More, at least 201% Black
All Municipalities Municipalities with less than 55%
Black Population
Electing Not Electing Total Electing Not Electing Total
Louisiana 45 (95.7%) 2 (4.3%) 47 42 (95.5%) 2 (4.5%0) 44
Mississippi 21 (60.0%) 14 (40.0%) 35 15 (51.7%) 14 (48.3%) 29
S. Carolina 17 (44.7%) 21 (55.3%) 38 16 (43.2%) 21 (56.8%) 37
Alabama 14 (35.9%) 25 (61.1%) 39 10 (28.60%) 25 (71.4%) 35
TOTALS 97 (610) 62 (3910) 159 83 (57.2%) 62 (43.8%) 145
The dramatic difference in the percentage of electing municipal-
ities between Louisiana and Alabama can be explained by the dif-
ference in methods of election, as the table below demonstrates.
78. A number of black elected officials whose names did not appear in the ROSTER
were discovered by a telephone survey of four of the southern states (see text accom-
panying notes 80-81, infra).The gap between the South and the remainder of the coun-
try thus may actually be larger than reported because of the more substantial reliance
on the ROSTER for information outside the South.
79. See THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at 99.
80. Information about election structure was obtained for Louisiana from Loul.
SIANA OFFICIALS, 1980 ROSTER; for South Carolina from 1980 DIRECTORY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS; for Alabama from LEGAL SERVICE CORPORATION OF
ALABAMA, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN ALABAMA (1981); and for Mississippi from infor-
mation collected by the author. The other states that make up the South region in tile
tables are Georgia, Texas, Virginia, and the portion of North Carolina covered by the
Voting Rights Act. Georgia and Texas, both of which have a low percentage of electing
municipalities (52 percent and 47 percent respectively) were eliminated from the more
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Methods of Election for Municipalities with
Populations of at least 5,000, 20-55% Black
WARDS AT-LARGE
Electing Not Electing Total Electing Not Electing Total
Louisiana 40 (100%) 0 40 2 (50.0%) 2 4
Mississippi 13 (72.2%) 5 18 2 (18.2%) 9 11
S. Carolina 4 (100%) 0 4 12 (36.4%) 21 32
Alabama 4 (100%) 0 4 6 (19.4%) 25 31
TOTALS 61 (92.4%) 5 (7.2%) 66 22 (27.8%/) 57 (72.2%) 79
Clearly, in these four states, black candidates' success is strongly
influenced by the method of election. This fact is demonstrated fur-
ther in Louisiana where a substantial changeover from at-large to
ward elections within the last several years was accompanied by a
dramatic increase in black elected officials. 1
Although additional information is needed to determine whether
electing and non-electing at-large municipalities in these states can
be distinguished on the basis of differences in their use of percent-
age-determining devices, some tentative observations can be made.
Except for Louisiana, South Carolina has the greatest percentage of
electing at-large municipalities, followed by Alabama and finally
Mississippi. Missisippi has a full slate requirement82 and numbered
posts are prevalent in Alabama." Alabama and Mississippi have non-
partisan elections and both require candidates to receive a majority
to win without a runoff." On the other hand, South Carolina has
neither a full slate nor a post requirement." South Carolina munici-
palities may. choose between partisan and non-partisan elections,"
and a majority vote requirement is optional.'
North Carolina, only partly covered by the Voting Rights Act,
presents an interesting contrast to the four Voting Rights Act
states studied. In terms of percentage of municipalities electing,
North Carolina's Voting Rights Act cities are similar to cities in the
border states: 61 percent have at least one black elected official. The
remaining non-Voting Rights Act cities resemble those in the North-
detailed examination because of the large number of cities involved and the difficulty
of obtaining accurate information on election structure. North Carolina is discussed
separately in the text accompanying notes 90 & 91, infra.
81. Information was obtained from city clerks. Louisiana is the only state where
wide discrepancies were noted between the present survey and the ROSTER.
82. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-11-15 (1972).
83. ALA. CODE §§ 11-46-25(f), 11-46-96(f) (Supp. 1980).
84. Nonpartisan elections: ALA. CODE § 11-46-3 (1975). Majority vote: ALA. CODE
§§ 11-46-55(a), 11-46-126(a) (Supp. 1980).
85, S.C. CODE f§ 5-15-63, 5-15-120 (Supp. 1980).
86. Id. §§ 5-15-60, 5-15-70 (Supp. 1980).
87. 1& §§ -15-61, 5-15-62, 5-15-63, 5-15-120 (Supp. 1980).
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east, with 75 percent electing at least one black. Even more unlike
the Voting Rights Act states studied, North Carolina's electing and
non-electing cities cannot be distinguished on the basis of differing
election structures, All but six of the fifty-six North Carolina munici-
palities in the sample have at-large elections. The percentage-deter-
mining factors are present in various combinations in electing and
non-electing cities. About half of both groups utilize plurality, non-
partisan elections."
The inability to correlate the election of blacks in some North
Carolina municipalities and not others with a difference in election
structure suggests that the race of a candidate is less significant
there-at least in the electing cities-than in the other four states
studied. Because the method of election is uniformly at-large in the
non-electing cities, the structure in combination with racial bloc
voting can explain the absence of black elected officials. However,
the data are insufficient to explain why some North Carolina cities
appear to be more racially oriented in their politics than others.89
When voting is along racial lines, election structure determina-
tion of a black candidate's chances for success logically follows:
racial bloc voting plus an election structure in which the number of
votes needed for election exceeds the number of black voters equals
no black office holders. As with other equations, a change in one of
the left side variables is necessary to produce a change in the right
side result. Unlike mathematics, however, one cannot conclude ab
solutely that the observed result (the absence of black office holders)
proves the existence of the unobserved variable (racial bloc voting).
Other potential explanations include the following: blacks have not
run for office; blacks voted for whites when faced with a black-white
choice, or did not vote at all; blacks lacked sufficient resources to
run a successful campaign in an at-large election system. The sub-
stantial number of blacks elected when the election structure allows
this to be accomplished without white support negates the first two
explanations. The third explanation, while having some validity, is
negated by the presence of black elected officials in large.majority
black at-large cities and by their absence in small nonmajority black
88. Information on election structure was obtained from INSTITUTE OF GOVERN-
MENT, THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, FORMS OF GOVERNMENT OF NORTH
CAROLINA CITIES (1979).
89. One possible explanation may be differing degrees of urbanization. All of the
nonelecting municipalities have populations of less than 20,000. Fifty percent of the
Voting Rights Act cities, 10,000-20,000 population, have an elected black official. Only
one of six in the 5,000 to 10,000 group has a black official. Among the non-Voting
Rights Act cities, two of five in the 10,000-20,000 group, and six of nine in the
5,000-10,000 group are electing cities.
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at-large cities. The observed result (no black elected officials) plus
the observed variable (the election structure) at least suggests the
existence of the unobserved variable (racial bloc voting).
Moreover, independent evidence of racial bloc voting is abun-
dant. Virtually all challenges to election structure on dilution
grounds have relied in part upon proof of racial bloc voting," usually
in the form of expert testimony based on examination of precinct
level election data. One recent study of precinct data in five
southern cities concluded that:
First, voting in large southern cities tends to follow racial lines.
Blacks typically give strong support to a particular candidate
and that candidate usually gets only a minority of white votes.
Second, when blacks run as candidates, these patterns are ac-
centuated. Virtually all blacks vote for the black candidate; very
few whites do so. Finally, racially polarized voting rose rapidly
in the 1960's and continues at a high level to the present."
This study and the data presented here strongly suggest that
the prevalence of racial block voting continues in the South. While
this practice remains true, blacks' chances for electing black can-
didates to municipal office are dependent almost entirely upon the
election structure. The dramatic impact of structures- particularly,
of the choice of election unit-is demonstrated by the fact that of
the seventy-nine non-majority black municipalities holding at-large
elections in the Deep South, only twenty-two (27.8 percent) have
even one black office holder, although among the sixty-six municipal-
ities holding ward elections sixty-one (92.4 percent) have at least one
black official.
A most important caveat is in order at this point. Neither black
political participation and black political influence nor more elusive
notions of "black representation" can be measured solely by
whether blacks are being elected to office. The Joint Center for
Political Studies' report on the 1976 election indicates that the bloc
of black votes received by Jimmy Carter was crucial to his victory
in thirteen states." In contested Senate races, black voters in nine
of the fifteen monitored elections supported winners, 3 with the
black vote supplying the margin of victory in two cases. Black votes
also provided the margin of victory for eight white congressional
90. See the cases cited in Part II, infra.
91. Murry & Vedlitz, Racial Voting Patterns in the South: An Analysis of Major
Elections from 1960 to 1977 in Five Cities, 439 ANNALS, AAPSS 29, 33 (1978).
92. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, THE BLACK VOTE ELECTION '76 10 (1977).
93. Id at 13.
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candidates." Whether this ability to deliver a bloc of votes trans-
lates into genuine political influence over candidates once elected
must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS: A
HISTORY OF THE DILUTION SUIT
"Such cases, involving the right to vote and the right to
litigate, share with the first amendment and due process
cases .. a core'structural idea that the right at stake is




Racially oriented politics coupled with election structures un-
favorable to the election of minority candidates often prevented
newly enfranchised blacks from utilizing the ballot as a means to
participate in the political process and, thus, in governmental and
societal decision-making. Blacks seeking judicial relief from this
situation utilized two approaches. The first approach claimed that,
the election structure was the product of intentional, race-conscious
gerrymandering,95 and was an extension to the voting area of the
suspect classification doctrine espoused in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion." The second approach claimed that the election structure
operated to dilute minority voting strength and was derived from
the rationale of the malapportionment cases in which the Supreme
Court first recognized that a citizen's assignment to a voting district
can diminish the value of his vote. Although both approaches often
were utilized in a single case, properly conceptualized they sought
protection of overlapping, but nonetheless different interests. The
former approach asserted a right to be free from state action based
on race while the latter claimed a right to effective political par-
ticipation derived from the right to vote.
In the recent decision of City of Mobile v. Bolden 7 a plurality of
94. Id.
95. Gerrymandering is "discriminatory districting which operates unfairly to in-
flate the political strength of one group and deflate that of another." Engstrom, The
Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle for Fair
and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIz. ST. L. J, 277. 279 (citation omitted).
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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the Supreme Court in effect refused to recognize a claim of dilution
by interpreting all the previous cases challenging election structure
as based upon intentional racial discrimination. This section will
distinguish the intentional racial gerrymandering cases from those
in the dilution line, and will discuss the evolution of dilution as a
separate constitutional claim.
A. Racial Gerrymandering
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot," the Supreme Court's initial and most
celebrated case involving a claim of racial gerrymandering, peti-
tioners challenged an Alabama law that changed the city boundaries
of Tuskegee, Alabama from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure
and excluded virtually all the city's black residents. The Court did
not address the fourteenth amendment claim and rested its decision
solely on the fifteenth amendment." Reversing the lower court's
dismissal of the complaint, the court concluded:
[If the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect
of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored
citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore voting
rights."' 0
The issue in Gomillion was whether an allegation of racially
motivated districting stated a claim for relief. The evidence
necessary to establish racial motivation in districting was first con-
sidered in Wright v. Rockefeller.' The complaint in Wright alleged
that Manhattan's four congressional districts had been drawn to
create racially segregated districts by concentrating black voting
strength in a single district. 2 The plaintiffs demonstrated that the
effect of the lines as drawn was to create strangely shaped districts,
one of which contained most of Manhattan's black and Puerto Rican
98. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
99. Mr. Justice Frankfurter probably chose this ground to avoid the possibility
that a fourteenth amendment decision could undercut the "political question" doctrine.
The case fell easily within the suspect classification doctrine of Brown, and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have treated Gomillion as if it had been decided on four-
teenth amendment grounds. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
100. 364 U.S. at 347.
101. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
102. This claim is the opposite of that maintained by minority plaintiffs in more re-
cent litigation, where the complaint is that to spread their voting strength among
districts results in their losing to the majority in all the districts. See, e.g., Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss.. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977).
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population.' 3 The defendants denied the racial gerrymandering
allegations, but offered little evidence of the rationale underlying
the districting plan."0' The Supreme Court affirmed the District,
Court's finding 5 that the plaintiffs had failed to establish racial
motivation. The Court refused to accept the segregative effect as
either sufficient in and of itself to establish a constitutional viola..
tion, or as prima facie evidence of a discriminatory intent.'" The
Court reasoned that even if the effects of the line-drawing sup.
ported an inference of an improper motive, such inference was insuf-
ficient to establish a prima facie case unless other legitimate in.,
ferences were negated. 7
Gomillion and Wright are cases that challenged state action
specifically on the basis of an impermissible racial classification.' "
Because of the procedural posture of Gomillion, the Supreme Court,
had to decide only if a claim for relief had been stated. The Court.
concluded that the plaintiff's allegations, if uncontroverted, admitted
of but one inference-intent by the state to deprive Negro citizens
of their pre-existing municipal vote. 9 Since Wright came to the
court after a full hearing on the merits the issue was whether the
plaintiffs had met their burden of proving the districting unconstitu..
tional. The plaintiffs relied upon the effects of the action to establish
the discriminatory intent. However, unlike the Gomillion situation,
plausible non-racial grounds for the state action could be inferred
from the facts."
103. 376 U.S. at 54.
104. "Appellees presented no oral testimony but did offer historical maps, a table
from the Bureau of the Census and a message from the President to the Congress on
the subject of congressional apportionment." 376 U.S. at 55.
105. Wright v. Rockefeller 211 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
106. 376 U.S. at 56-57.
107. An equally plausible explanation was that the Republican legislature had
created a "safe" Republican district to avoid a Democratic sweep of the four Manhat-
tan districts. To further complicate the case, black parties and intervenors on both
sides made difficult an assessment of whether black representational interests were
adversely affected by the districting plan. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 466 (1968).
108. Some commentators have seen Gomillion as.being an "effect" case. See, e.g.,
Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering and Black Voting Rights,
24 RUT. L. REV. 521, 524 (1970). The Court itself in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971), said of Gomillion, "the focus ... was on the actual effect of the enactment,
not upon the motivation .... 403 U.S. at 225. This seems to be an incorrect reading
of the opinion.
109. 364 U.S. at 341.
110. Wright could not have proceeded as a purely fifteenth amendment case unless
"deprivation of the right to vote" was seen as something more than previously
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B. The Malapportionment Cases: One Man-One Vote
While these cases were progressing through the courts, a widely
publicized line of voting cases was developing in a nonracial set-
ting. Following in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Carr"' that removed malapportionment cases from the
restrictions of the political question doctrine,"' Reynolds v. ISims"'
and its companion cases"' mandated equal population districts for
both houses of bicameral state legislatures."' The holding was based
on equal protection grounds:
[A]n individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitu-
tionally impaired when its weight is in a substantive fashion
diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other
parts of the state."'
The malapportionment cases were pure numbers cases-an
equal number of representatives for an equal number of voters-but
the reasoning suggests that the right to vote goes beyond the right
to cast a ballot, and might require equal political participation for all
citizens of all races."' These decisions recognized that the political
process could not be expected to correct the underrepresentation of
voters in overpopulated districts, because those benefiting from ex-
recognized. Unlike the de-annexed blacks in Gomillion who could not vote in Tuskegee
city council elections, no minority voter was denied the right to vote for some con-
gressman in the Manhattan district. Thus Wright impliedly recognized that racially
motivated districting presents a denial of equal protection.
111. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
112. The Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr that federal courts had jurisdiction
over claims that state legislative apportionments violated the fourteenth amendment;
that residents of malapportioned districts had standing to assert such claims; and that
such claims were justiciable despite previous "political questions" precedents. 369 U.S.
186 (1962).
113. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
114. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964);
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964).
115. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court held that the right to cast
an equally weighted vote applied to election of statewide executive officers as well. In
another pre-Reynolds case, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court held that
article I, section 2 of the Constitution requires the states to apportion congressional
representatives according to population. Subsequent cases extended the rule to local
governments. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
116. 377 U.S. at 533, 568.
117. Id.
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isting apportionment were not likely to vote themselves out of of-
fice. As one astute observer of the interrelationship between the
judiciary and the political process noted:
The ultimate rationale [of the reapportionment decisions] is that
when political avenues for redressing political problems become
dead-end streets, the judicial intervention in the politics of the
people may be essential in order to have any effective politics.",
Two cases decided shortly after Reynolds indicated the Court's
willingness to consider more qualitative aspects of representation.
In Fortson v. Dorsey,"' residents of Georgia challenged their assign-
ment to a multi-member state senatorial district on non-racial
grounds. The Court declared that multi-member districts are not per
se unconstitutional. But in doing so Justice Brennan observed:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of
a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to
consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.'20
This language was quoted approvingly in Burns v. Richardson,"'
another unsuccessful challenge to multi-member districts on non-
racial grounds. However, the majority added a caveat that no pre-*
sumptions would be made that a particular multi-member scheme
"effects an invidious result.... Speculations do not supply evidence
that the multi-member districting was designed to have or had the in-
vidious effect necessary to a judgment of... unconstitutionality ...
118. R. DIXON, supra note 107, at 8.
119. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). In a companion case to Reynolds, Lucas v. Colorado
General As8embly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), the Court affirmed the constitutionality of
multi-member districts and at-large elections, but noted several undesirable features:
(1) they require long and cumbersome ballots: (2) voters have difficulty making in-
telligent choices among candidates; (3) elected representatives lack identifiable consti-
tuencies within populous districts: (4) there is an absence of any individual member
elected specifically to represent residents of more populous counties. Id. at 731 n.21.
That these features are merely "undesirable" rather than "unconstitutional" was af-
firmed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). There the Court held constitutional
a multi-member plan for Marion County, Indiana, where in the 1962 primary the ballot
was 90 names long. Data gathered after the election indicated that voters chose can-
didates on the basis of party endorsement and by the alphabet. See Hamilton,
Legislative Constituencies: Single Member Districts, Multi-Member Districts, and
Floterial Districts, 20 WEST. POL. Q. 321, 323 (1967).
120. 379 U.S. at 439.
121. 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
122. Id. at 88.
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The Court enumerated three contributing factors to a showing of an
"invidious effect": (1) large districts in relation to the total number
of legislators, (2) no residential sub-districts, (3) multi-member
districts in both houses of the legislature.' "
C. Dilution Clarified: Whitcomb v. Chavis
Following these decisions, a few cases in the lower courts
challenged multi-member districts primarily on the basis of inten-
tional race-conscious gerrymandering,12' but occasionally on a "dilu-
tion" theory.2 Since dilution beyond the pure numerical situation
had not been defined by the Court, attempts to prove a case were
"shots in the dark." The first substantial dilution claim based on
detailed proof to reach the Supreme Court was Whitcomb v.
Chavis.'12 The plaintiff, black residents of an Indianapolis ghetto
area, challenged a multi-member district that met all the Burns fac-
tors: large, non-residential sub-districts, from which both the
county's senators and representatives were to be elected. The
District Court reasoned that dilution could be established by proof
that the ghetto residents were a cognizable racial or political ele-
ment of the population and that their voting strength was minimized
by the use of multi-member districts. Minimization required a show-
ing that the group would be able to elect a member of the group if
single member districts were utilized but were less likely to do so in
a multi-member situation. A further indication of minimization
would be evidence that none of the legislators elected by the multi-
member district were accountable to the group for their legislative
record. Finding all these conditions established, the District Court
ruled that the plaintiffs had been deprived of equal protection. 2 '
The hopes of civil rights groups and the praise of commen-
123. Id
124. See, e.g., Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified and affd,
386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967); Sellers v. Trussell, 253 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Sims
v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
125. Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), affd in part and rev'd in
part, Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
126. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
127. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1385 (S.D. Ind. 1969). Most of the
evidence in the case was statistical data directed toward proving the ghetto residents
a "cognizable minority," differing racially and socio-economically from the remainder of
the county. Because of these differences, the ghetto residents had a "compelling in-
terest in such legislative areas as urban renewal and rehabilitation, health care,
employment training and opportunities, and welfare, and relief of the poor, law en-
forcement, quality of education, and anti-discrimination measures" not shared by the
remainder of the district. Id at 1380. Having concluded that the plaintiffs constituted a
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tators 128 that finally a formula for dilution had been derived were
short-lived. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no allegation of
purposeful discrimination that would bring the case within the
Gomillion line of decisions, and no evidence that petitioners had
been denied access to the political process:
Nor does the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were
legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population satisfac-
torily prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and find-
ings that ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other...
residents to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice. We have discovered nothing in the
record or in the court's findings indicating that poor Negroes
were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party
they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be
equally represented on those occasions when legislative candi-
dates were chosen. Nor did the evidence purport to show or the
court find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded
from the slates of both major parties, thus denying them the
chance of occupying legislative seats.2
Thus the Courtrejected the conclusion that a cognizable minority
plus numerical underrepresentation equaled dilution. Furthermore,
the Court saw the absence of ghetto legislators not as a function of
their minority status, but rather as a consequence of their party af-
filitation-the Democrats had lost four of the five elections during
the period considered by the district court. 3 '
Because Whitcomb is one of only two cases before Mobile to be
decided by the Court on a dilution theory, several points deserve
emphasis. First, had the Court considered the plaintiffs' claim of
dilution to be a shorthand expression for "the effects of the district-
ing are evidence of discriminatory intent" (the Gomillion- Wright
rationale) the opinion would have been very short because the plain-
tiffs conceded that a claim of discriminatory intent had no basis.'3'
The plaintiffs lost not because the effects of multi-member districts
were unintended, but because the effects did not constitute dilution.
cognizable minority, the district court noted that while the ghetto residents were
17.81 percent of the county's population, they were less than 6 percent of the county's
elected representatives. Single member districts would have resulted in approximately
proportional numerical representation for the ghetto. Id. at 1385.
128. See, e.g, Note, supra note 108.
129. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971).
130. Id. at 152-53.
131. Id. at 149.
[Vol. 42
VOTE DILUTION
Second, the record indicated that voting in the county had pro-
ceeded along party rather than racial lines. For example, in 1968
three blacks Republicans were elected county-wide with approx-
imately the same number of votes as white Republicans. However,
they ran well behind their white Democratic opponents in the ghet-
to. The black ghetto residents' exclusion from office was thus a
function of their being Democrats rather than of their race.'
D. The Standardbearer: White v. Regester
In 1973, the Supreme Court for the first time affirmed a lower
court's determination that a multi-member districting plan unconsti-
tutionally diluted the voting strength of a cognizable racial minority.
The relevant portion of the case concerned challenges by blacks and
Mexican-Americans to the use of multi-member districts in two coun-
ties as part of the 1970 Texas House reapportionment scheme. Plain-
tiffs and the lower court carefully distinguished Whitcomb and con-
centrated on the issue of exclusion from the political process.'3 The
lower court found Whitcomb distinguishable on the following
grounds:
1. The election structure. In addition to multi-member districts,
Texas had a majority vote requirement in the primary 35 and candi-
dates were required to run from posts, called "places" in Texas. The
post provision accentuated black/white contests, and because the re-
quirement was not tied to residency, all the county's representation
132. Ld. at 150 n.30.
133. The election results for the five elections considered by the district court in-
dicated that an individual candidate's fate was linked to his party's fate. A candidate
was elected only if his party carried the county. The winning party's margin was often
less than 3 percent. For example, in 1964 the Republicans received 48.61 percent of the
votes, but lost every seat-thus leaving 49 percent of this county's population
"unrepresented." Thus even though it left the door open as to the possibility of
establishing racial dilution, Whitcomb seemingly rejected the "political element"
branch of the dilution dictum from Fortson and Burns. The Court clearly, was not
disturbed by the fact that the large multi-member district allowed a slim majority of
the county's voters to elect all 23 of its legislators. See Derfner, Multi-Member
Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120 (1972). Subsequently in Gaffney v. Cum-
mings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court approved an apportionment plan for Connecticut
which was drawn specifically to preserve the statewide strength of the state's two ma-
jor parties. In approving the plan, however, the Court distinguished between
"recognizing party strength" and minimizing it. Id. at 754.
134. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
135. Id at 725. The court noted this requirement as virtually unknown outside the
South. Id
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theoretically could live in the same apartment complex.' The disad-
vantage to the minority was exacerbated further by the size of the
districts.3 '
2. History of racial discrimination. Texas had a long and fairly
recent history of public and private discrimination against both
blacks and Mexican-Americans 8' in contrast to the record of Indiana
which had been examined in Whitcomb. Both Texas goups qualified
as cognizable minorities on the basis of the internal group interest
and, perhaps more importantly, on the basis of the treatment afford-
ed group members by the majority because their group status. 3 "
3. Access to the political process. Unlike Indiana, where blacks
played a crucial role in party politics, minorities in the two Texas
counties were not effective participants in party politics. In one
county, a political committee controlled the primary slating process.
While some blacks had been slated, the choice was made without
consulting the black community. Thus blacks were permitted to
enter the political process only through the "grace" of the white ma-
jority."'
In the other county, bloc voting by whites in the Democratic
primary, which was tantamount to election, precluded any realistic
possibility of Mexican-Americans being elected because even though
a numerical majority of the county, they represented only 30 per-
cent of the registered voters."' The Court viewed this low participa-
136. Id. Thus the election structure was the most disadvantageous to minorities.
See discussion in Part II, supra.
137. Id. at 724-25. The county's population was greater than that of fifteen states.
Id. The other multi-member districts in the plan were much less populous and were to
elect 2 to 4 representatives. These other districts were challenged also, but because of
time constraints all the parties agreed to concentrate on Dallas and Bexar. Id at 718
n.7. The remaining districts were invalidated in Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640
(W.D. Texas 1974), vacated and remanded, White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
138. "There exist innumerable instances, coverning virtually the entire gamut of
human relationships, in which the State had adopted and maintained an official policy
of racial discrimination against the Negro." 343 F. Supp. at 725 (citations omitted). In
the voting area Texas employed "all white" primaries (see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1926), discussed in Part I, supra), the poll tax (struck down in United States v.
Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966), .ff'd, 384 U.S. 155 (1955)), and the most
restrictive voter registration procedures in the nation. 343 F. Supp. at 731.
139. The court devoted several pages of the opinion to a documentation of the per-
vasive state sanctioned discrimination against Mexican-Americans, placing particular
emphasis on the problems of cultural incompatibility fostered by a deficient educa-
tional system. 343 F. Supp. at 727-32.
140. Id. at 726.
141. Id. at 733.
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tion to be a result of past discrimination, particularly the language
and cultural incompatibility fostered by a deficient education
system:
This cultural and language impediment, conjoined with the poll
tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the
nation have operated to effectively deny Mexican-Americans ac-
cess to the political, processes in Texas even longer than the
Blacks were formally denied access by the white primary.4 '
4. Responsiveness of elected representatives. Whereas unre-
sponsiveness experienced by the plaintiffs in Whitcomb had been a
function of their party affiliation, unresponsiveness in Texas
resulted from racial and ethnic discrimination. One county delega-
tion consistently favored segregating legislation. In addition, racial
campaign tactics were still prevalent, suggesting that people elected
on such a platform were unlikely to represent the black commun-
ity."' The white representative of the other county could not ident-
ify any legislation sponsored by that county's delegation to relieve
adverse conditions in the Mexican-American community."4
These factors led the district court to conclude that the dilution
standard of Whitcomb had been met; thus it ordered the multi-
member districts replaced by single-member districts. The Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed.' 5 The Court stated the vague dilution
"standard" from Whitcomb:
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings
that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in question -
that its members had less opportunity than did other residents
in the district to participate in the political processes and elect
legislators of their choice." '
The Court then summarized the lower court's findings and con-
cluded as to one county that they were sufficient to sustain the
judgment. As to the other, the Court deferred to the district court:
[F]rom its own special vantage point, [the district court] con-
cluded that the multi-member districts as designed and operated
142. Id. at 731.
143. I& at 726-27.
144. Id. at 732.
145. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The Court was unanimous on the dilution issue. Justices
Brennan. Douglas and Marshall dissented from the portion of the opinion reversing the
lower court's ruling that the Texas plan violated one-man, one-vote standards.
146. 412 U.S. at 766.
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* . .invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective par-
ticipation in political life .... On the record before us, we are
not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do
a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design
and impact of the Bexar County multi-member district in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise."7
Although evidence in the record would have supported the lower
court's judgment on a Gomillion rationale,'48 the Court relied entirely
upon the dilution claim, citing only those cases in the dilution line-
Whitcomb, Burns and Fortson.""
E. The Lower Courts Respond
White provided the needed authority for pursuing dilution
claims, but the case provided little guidance for the pursuit. In the
years after White dozens of cases challenged multi-member and at-
large election systems. The task of further defining dilution and ex-
plaining why it was unconstitutional fell to the lower courts,
primarily those of the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded in Zimmer v.
McKeithen'0 that dilution could be established upon proof of some
combination of factors gleaned from White. This so-called "totality
of the circumstances doctrine,"' 1 ' posited a set of "primary" factors
and a set of "enhancing" factors. The primary factors enumerated
were: (1) lack of minority access to the slating of candidates; (2) un-
147. 412 U.S. at 769-70.
148. The state's explanation for its rather haphazard combination of single and
multi-member districts was less than satisfactory. Although most of the multi-member
districts were metropolitan areas, the laregest such area in the state was divided into
single member districts. No acceptable reason was given for the distinction. Three of
the eleven multi-member districts were entire counties, but in the eight others, "the
district lines cut boundaries without rhyme or reason," 343 F. Supp. at 718. This lack
of justification combined with a documented political hostility toward the minorities in-
volved would have been sufficient to support the inference that the multi-member
districts had been adopted to decrease the possibility that minorities would be elected
from these counties. See Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (the court
concluded that the only explanation for a plan combining predominantly black counties
with predominantly white ones, in light of the state's racial history, was that the state
wished to avoid the election of blacks to the legislature).
149. 412 U.S. at 765.
150. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd sub nom., East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
151. See J. DANTZLER, ELECTION LAW, 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN
LAW-ELECTION LAW 91 (1979); Note, Discriminatory Effect of Elections At-Large:
The "Totality of Circumstances" Doctrine, 41 ALB. L. REV. 363 (1977).
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responsiveness of legislators to the particularized interests of
minorities; (3) a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for
multi-member, at-large districts; or (4) a history of past discrimination
in general that precludes the effective participation in the election
system. Proof of dilution could be "enhanced" by showing the ex-
istence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single
shot voting provisions, and the lack of residency subdistricts."'5 The
court failed to explain, however, what combination of these elements
would be sufficient to establish dilution or why all or any group of
them would constitute dilution.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals order man-
dating single member districts for the parish, but expressly "with-
out approval of the constitutional views expressed by the Court of
Appeals."'" Instead the Court based its decision on its announced
preference for single-member districts in court-ordered plans.' 5
152. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
153. The Court in Zimmer actually enumerated only two primary factors and one-
and-a-half enhancing factors. The primary factors were past racial discrimination and a
tenuous policy underlying the choice of at-large elections. The enhancing factors were
the majority vote requirement and an anti-single shot provision for the three seats
elected from one of the seven residency wards. The court made no mention of racial
bloc voting or the lack of access to the slating process and found the absence of proof
of unresponsiveness "indecisive." Nor did the court find the following facts, which dif-
fered from those in White, sufficient to justify a different result: (1) at issue in Zimmer
was an at-large election system for the police jury and school board of a sparsely
populated rural parish rather than a large multi-member state legislative district; (2)
blacks were a majority of the population and a substantial minority of the registered
voters; (3) the at-large plan provided for residency sub-districts; and (4) three blacks
had been elected under the at-large plan. 485 F.2d at 1307.
154. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 638 (1976).
155. I& at 639. Zimmer originally was brought by a white resident on the grounds
that the parish's wards were malapportioned. Over the objection of the black in-
tervenor, the district court approved an at-large election plan favored by the govern-
ing bodies involved. The Court of Appeals reversed on dilution grounds, but the
Supreme Court's affirmance was based solely on the grounds that "the District Court
abused its discretion in not initially ordering a single member reapportionment plan."
424 U.S. at 638-39. The Court's preference for single member districts in court-ordered
plans was explained in Chapmans v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), a case involving the con-
stitutionality of a federal court-ordered reapportionment of the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly. The Court explained that since the plan originated with the
district court, rather than the legislature, it was not entitled to the deference normally
afforded legislative devices. Therefore in its role as supervisor of the remedies
fashioned by the lower courts, the Supreme Court could recognize the practical
weaknesses inherent in multi-member plans. Id. at 15. The weaknesses were the same
as those mentioned in Lucas. In addition the Court found the possible effect of multi-
member districts on minority voting strength objectionable.
"Except for the probable submergence of the black vote, none of the objections
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Taking seriously the notion that dilution could be established by
an "aggregate of factors," the district courts and appellate panels of
the Fifth Circuit for a while employed a "Chinese menu" approach to
dilution: two from column A (primary factors) plus one from column
B (enhancing factors) equal dilution, but a change in the choice of
items could yield a different result."6 Initially the looseness of the
standard seemed to benefit the challenger, who by establishing little
more than judicially noticeable, past racial discrimination plus at-
large elections was able to obtain relief.'57 These early successes
prompted one scholar to question "whether a per se rule against at-
large systems [applies] in the six Southern states."'58 Subsequently,
however, this comment proved to be too optimistic an evaluation of
the plaintiff's position. In a series of cases not clearly distinguish-
able from Zimmer and other cases plaintiffs had won, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the district courts' determinations of dilution. ' The
most frequently cited reason for reversal was an insufficient factual
record to support the decision.'
enumerated in Chapman were present in East Carroll Parish. The parish's 1970
population was only 12,884. Voter confusion was not a likely problem since only 10
representatives were to be elected to each body. Representatives were to be elected
from residential sub-districts so voters would be able to point to a specific "area"
representative. Because the plan was an at-large one, the third objectional feature of
multi-member districts was not a possibility. Because the possible submergence of the
black vote was the only rationale from Chapman to apply, one might reasonably
assume that this factor alone would be sufficient to invoke the rule.
The following year in Wallace v. House, 425 U.S. 947 (1976) (mem.) the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals' order of a mixed plan for a small Louisiana town
whose at-large plan had been held unconstitutional. Thus it seemed that an ad-
ministrative preference developed in connection with state apportionment plans had
become per se rule governing even aldermanic elections in a small town.
However, recently the Court has avoided the administrative preference by finding
proposed plans to be "legislative" rather than "court-ordered," and thus entitled to be
considered under a "constitutional," rather than "administrative" standard. See Wise
v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
156. Compare Gilbert v. Stervett, 509 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1975) and McGill v.
Gadsden County Commission, 535 F.2d 277 (1976) (cases finding no dilution) with the
cases cited in note 157, infra.
157. See, e.g., Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (1973), Moore v. LeFlove Bd. of
Election Com'ns, 502 F.2d 621 (1974), Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. La.
1974) aff'd 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded 425 U.S. 947 (1976); Pitts
v. Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1975), vacated on other grounds, sub nom. Pitts v.
Gaters, 536 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976).
158. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem,
10 GA. L. REV. 353, 379 (1976).
159. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976) (Nevitt I); David v.
Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977); Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1976).
160. Id.
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After the Supreme Court's declaration in Washington v. Davis"'
that discriminatory impact alone is insufficient to state a claim
under the equal protection clause, a major issue in dilution cases
became the "need" to prove intentional discrimination. The Fifth Cir-
cuit first addressed the issue in Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors.'
Kirksey involved a single-member district plan that divided a
Mississippi county's black population among five councilmanic
districts. The court first noted that in the past blacks had been in-
tentionally excluded from participation in the political process. '
Even though the challenged plan had not been drawn for a discrim-
inatory purpose, it did not present the county's 40 percent black
population with a realistic opportunity to elect a single black to the
council.' Therefore, the court concluded that the plan would perpet-
uate the effect of the prior intentional exclusion of blacks from the
political process, and thus the intent requirement had been met.'
Although the Fifth Circuit en banc broached the subject of intent
in Kirksey, the next two panel decisions returned to the "aggregate of
factors" analysis.' The intent issue received full attention the follow-
ing year in a group of cases decided together. Perhaps because the
relationship between the basis for a dilution claim and the dilution
formula had never been precisely defined, the Fifth Circuit was
unable analytically to distinguish dilution from other equal protec-
tion cases. Thus after five years of using an "effects" test, the court
declared in Nevett v. Sides "" that dilution which states a claim must
result from a racially discriminatory purpose. However, the court
further concluded that the presence of the Zimmer factors is cir-
cumstantial evidence of a discriminatory purpose. 8'
This retreat from the effects standard by the Fifth Circuit-the
Circuit that had developed most of the law in dilution cases-may
161. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
162. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
163. Id. at 143-44.
164. Id. at 149.
165. Id. at 151. The court analogized to the school desegregation case of Green v.
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Supreme Court imposed a duty
on the school board to adopt an affirmative, rather than a neutral, desegregation plan.
554 F.2d 139, 148 n.16.
166. See Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 563 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1977); David v.
Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977).
167. 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978). The other cases were Bolden v. City of Mobile,
571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United For Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of
Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); and Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v.
Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
168. 571 F.2d at 221-22.
1982]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
have influenced the reasoning of the six members of the Supreme
Court who in City of Mobile v. Bolden agreed that discriminatory in-
tent is a necessary element of a dilution claim. Had the Fifth Circuit
developed and adhered to a standard for dilution based upon the
denial of the right to vote, the outcome in Mobile perhaps would
have been different.
IV. City of Mobile v. Bolden: AN UNTIMELY DEFAULT ON THE
PROMISE OF MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
"The theoretical foundations [for the American approach
to government] are shattered where . . . the right to
vote is granted in form, but denied in substance."
Justice Thurgood Marshall,
dissenting, City of Mobile v.
Bolden
In 1975 black citizens of Mobile, Alabama challenged the city's
form of government on the grounds that the system diluted their
voting strength and thereby violated the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."89
Although blacks by 1970 constituted over one-third of Mobile's popu-
lation, no black had ever been elected to the city's governing body.""
The district court held for the plaintiffs; a panel of the Fifth Circuit,
affirmed;"' the Supreme Court reversed. "2
A. The Lower Courts
In a detailed opinion following the guidelines of White and Zim-
mer, the district court concluded that the city's election structure
diluted black voting strength. Since 1911 the city had been governed
by a three-member city commission, elected at large, in a nonpart-
isan election, from numbered posts,' with a majority vote required
169. Bolden v. City of Mobile. 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
170. Id. at 388.
171. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
172. City of Mobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
173. Although the Commissioners were elected from numbered posts, residential
sub-districts were never connected to the posts. Until 1965 the posts were not con-
nected to specific governmental functions. In 1965, the law was changed to provide for
the posts to coincide with the three municipal departments: Public Works and Ser-
vices; Public Safety; and Finance. Id. at 386. After the dilution suit had been filed (and
presumably after the law had been administered for ten years), Mobile submitted this
1965 change to the Attorney General for preclearance under section 5. The Attorney
General interposed an objection to the change on the ground that to assign specific
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for election."' The district court found the city to be very racially
polarized. Virtually all public desegregation had been pursuant to
court order.7 ' Because of racially polarized voting no black-supported
candidate had ever been elected to public office in a majority white
district in any election involving city voters."' 6 Blacks as a group
lacked the political clout to insure that elected officials considered
their particularized needs.'
The distirct court rejected the city's argument that the
Washington v. Davis requirement of discriminatory intent in equal
protection cases applied to dilution. The court noted that the record
supported a finding of discriminatory purpose under a tort theory of
intent,'78 but based its decision on the theory that Washington was
functions to the post would "lock in" the at-large method of election. Bolden v. City of
Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 241 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
174. 423 F. Supp. 384, 393.
175. 423 F. Supp. at 389. The court noted the following suits. Allen v. City of
Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973) (to desegregate the police department); Anderson v. Mobile
County Comm'n, CA. No. 7388-72-H (S.D. Ala. 1973) (enjoining racial discrimination);
Sawyer v. City of Mobiel, 208 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Ala. 1961) (to desegregate the
municipal golf course); Evans v. Mobile City Lines, Inc., C.A. No. 2193-63 (S.D. Ala.
1963) (to desegregate public transportation); Cooke v. City of Mobile, C.A. No. 2634-63
(S.D. Ala. 1963) (to desegregate the city airport).
176. One sympathetic white had served as a city commissioner from 1953 to 1969,
but testimony indicated that after a large number of blacks were enfranchised by the
Voting Rights Act in 1965, he was defeated because of white backlash provoked by his
identification with the black community. 423 F. Supp. at 388. Expert witnesses testified
blacks had no reasonable chance of election. Id. at 389. Pursuant to court order, the
Mobile County state seats in the legislature were elected by single member districts.
Blacks had been elected to the legislature from majority black districts, tending to
negate the suggestion that black Mobileans simply were politically apathetic. Id.
177. This fact was demonstrated in part by numerous discrimination law suits
directed against the city; by the underrepresentation of blacks in all areas of city
employment, especially higher level policymaking positions; by failure of the city com-
mission to appoint blacks to city boards; by deficiencies in the city's provision of ser-
vices to the black community; and by failure to give serious attention to matters of
special concern to the black community such as police brutality and cross burnings. Id.
at 389-82. The City's brief to the Supreme Court cited evidence in the record to the ef-
fect that all commission candidates actually seek black votes; that two of the three
commissioners elected in 1973 won with the endorsement of the City's principal black
voter organization; and one of the present commissioners was elected by the black swing
vote. Brief for Appellant at 7-10. However, the district court's findings to the con-
trary were "factual" and were not to be disturbed on appeal unless they were clearly
erroneous. Furthermore, the plurality's opinion accepted the facts as found by the
district court. 446 U.S. at 73.
178. See 423 F. Supp. at 398. Intent, under a tort theory, could be found upon proof
that dilution was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the at-large system adopted
in 1911, even though it was not needed then because blacks were disfranchised.
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distinguishable: "Initial discriminatory purpose in employment and
in redistricting is entirely different from resulting voter dilution
because of racial discrimination."'79 The court then concluded that,
participation in the processes leading to nomination and election in
Mobile were not equally open to blacks and that the plaintiffs had
therefore established dilution in accordance with the totality of the.
circumstances standard of White and Zimmer.80
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had concluded in a
companion case 8' that Washington required a showing of intentional
discrimination in dilution cases, affirmed on the grounds that proof
of the White-Zimmer criteria amounted to circumstantial evidence
that the at-large system. had been maintained for a discriminatory
purpose."2 The appeals court felt that even if the statute had been
adopted for a neutral purpose in 1911, the record established that
the law had been maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The cir-
cumstantial inference of purpose from proof, of the White-Zimmer
criteria was bolstered by evidence that the Alabama legislature was
aware of the consequences of the city's election procedure and refused
to change it. This inaction, the court concluded, constituted direct
evidence of a discriminatory motive in the maintenance of the
plan. 18
B. The Case in the Supreme Court
After months of consideration and two rounds of oral arguments
the Supreme Court, speaking through six opinions, reversed the
lower courts. The plurality, comprised of Justice Stewart, the Chief
Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, concluded that nothing
short of proof that the at-large system had been selected or reaf-
firmed because of, not merely despite, its adverse effects on the
minority group would suffice to show the system discriminatory. 8'
179. Id.
180. Id. at 402.
181. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1978).
182. 571 F.2d at 245. The panel also concluded in Nevett that "intent" was critical
to the fifteenth amendment claim as well. 571 F.2d at 220.
183. 571 F.2d at 246. Prior to 1965 the commissioners exercised jointly all ex-
ecutive, legislative, and administrative functions. The court viewed the assignment in
1965 of specific duties to the previously undesignated posts on the eve of increasing
black registration as an effort by the legislature to provide additional policy grounds
to insulate the at-large plan from attack. Id. If this was the reason for the change, the
Alabama legislature was unusually farsighted and well-informed. In 1965 no case had
yet come close to holding an at-large election system unconstitutional.
184. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Justice Stevens, concurring, rejected "subjective intent" as
a standard but would find unconstitutionality only upon "objective effects" and a lack
of legitimate justification for the plan. Id at 90. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the
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They rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claim for failure to
prove purposeful discrimination as required by Washington, Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp,, 9 and Per-
sonnel Administrator of Massachusettes v. Fenney,'8 and thus
refused to view political participation as fundamentally different
from employment and housing. The plurality reconciled this holding
with White v. Regester by insisting that White was a standard
equal protection case, consistent with the principle that "'the in-
vidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.'"'8 The
White criteria were relevant for the very reason that disproportion-
ate impact alone is insufficient to prove discrimination.
Although the Court of Appeals had recognized the importance of
"intent" to prove an equal protection claim, the plurality found mis-
placed the court's reliance on the so-called Zimmer criteria as evi-
dence of a discriminatory purpose. First, although no black had been
elected to the Mobile City Commission, this fact could not support
the conclusion that blacks were excluded from the political process
because undisputed evidence showed that they registered and voted
freely. Second, evidence of unresponsiveness of elected officials
might well support another sort of lawsuit, but it said little about
the validity of the system under which the unresponsive officials
had been elected. Third, the past history of racial discrimination
could not condemn present, lawful governmental action. Finally, the
mechanics of the at-large system and the majority vote requirement
could not supply the requisite proof of racially discriminatory pur-
pose because the requirement was disadvantageous to any voting
minority. 8
The plurality also found lacking the plaintiffs' claim that
Mobile's election system violated the fifteenth amendment: "[Alction
by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. '" 89 The
result, assumed that intent was necessary. He voted for reversal because the remedy-
changing the form of government-was an abuse of judicial discretion. Id. at 80.
Justice White, dissenting, felt that intent was necessary but that it had been proved.
Id. at 94-103. Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that intent should not be a require-
ment in a dilution case. Id. at 104-05. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Marshall. Id
at 94.
185. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
186. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
187. 446 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 72-74.
189. d. at 62,
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Court refused to read the "right to vote" language of the amend.
ment to mean anything more than the right to " 'register and vote
without hindrance.' '"' Because the district court had found no im-
pediments to these activities, the fifteenth amendment was not,
violated.'91 The plurality also rejected the argument that section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act should have a broader prohibition than the
fifteenth amendment. 2
The remainder of the plurality opinion refutes the dissent's
theory, which it strains to characterize as a claim for a minority
group's right to "proportional representation," the impairment of
which can be established without proof of intent. The plurality con-
cluded that the constitution secures no such right, and thus there is
no need to subject the alleged dilution-causing legislation to
anything more than a "'settled mode of constitutional analysis.' ".... It
further concluded that no such right flows from Reynolds v. Sims,
which held that the right to have an equally effective voice in the
election of representatives was denied by malapportioned districts,
because malapportionment cannot be a problem in a unitary elec-
toral district. Any attempt to expand an individual voter's right to
cast an equally weighted vote to a group's right to representation
cannot be based on Reynolds. Such a theory would have no reason-
able basis for containment. 9'
C. Criticism of the Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion in Mobile, which refused to recognize dilu-
tion as a constitutional claim without proof of discriminatory pur-
pose, cannot easily be reconciled with White, which found a constitu-
tional violation on similar facts. Consequently, one must conclude
that Mobile in effect overrules White and thus severely restricts the
scope of the constitutional right to vote.
The plurality's characterization of Whitcomb and White as stan-
dard equal protection cases involving intentional discrimination is
clearly revisionism; neither relied upon such a theory.' Even i[
190. Id at 65 (citation omitted).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 60-61.
193. Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
194. Id. at 77-79.
195. See the discussion of White and Whitcomb in Part III, supra. The existence of
such an unarticulated premise in White is negated by the failure of the trial court and
the Supreme Court to rely upon evidence of the lack of a legitimate rationale on the
part of Texas for the creation of the multi-member districts involved.
In Whitcomb, the plaintiffs admitted that the districting plan had not been designed
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White is seen as an intentional discrimination case, the difference in
outcome between it and Mobile is difficult to justify, especially in
light of the plurality's approving citation of the standard developed
in Whitcomb and White for a prima facie case of dilution.1" Under
that standard the plaintiff must "produce evidence to support the
finding that the political processes leading to nomination and elec-
tion were not equally open to participation by the group(s) in ques-
tion.",""
Reconciliation of Mobile with White and retention of this stan-
dard can only be accomplished by interpreting White as having re-
quired intentionally discriminatory state action. If this interpretation
is accepted and a finding of the requisite intent in White is assumed,
reconciliation further requires the assumption that application of a dif-
ferent rule to at-large elections from that applied to multi-member
districts' is not needed. Moreover, reconciling the two decisions re-
quires acceptance of at least one of the following propositions.
1. Evidence in White established that blacks had been denied
meaningful political participation but failed to establish a similar
denial in Mobile. Finding factual support in the two opinions for this
distinction is difficult. In both White and Mobile, a substantial
minority group had been singled out by the majority for discrimina-
tory treatment on the basis of an unavoidable group characteristic.
Not only had the groups historically been subjected to public and
private discrimination, but the majority's voting behavior showed
that discrimination also continued. A candidate's identification with
a racial group was the chief characteristic that distinguished candi-
dates supported by the group from those not receiving support.
for a discriminatory purpose, and in White the unanimous opinion of the Court did not
rely upon a single intentional discrimination case. Moreover, no recent equal protection
case requiring intent has relied upon Whitcomb or White. See Note, Racial Vote Dilu-
tion in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Washington v.
Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1978).
196. 446 U.S. at 68-69 (citation omitted).
197. 412 U.S. at 765-67.
198. The plurality made that assumption. 446 U.S. at 70. One might argue that the
selection or maintenance of at-large elections because of their widespread acceptance
as legitimate electoral systems and indeed their acclaim as progressive alternatives to
the "rotten borroughs" produced by ward systems should be entitled to greater
deference than the less popular muilti-member legislative districts. This decision would
be particularly true when the use of such districts was not normal state procedure (as
was the case in White). However, the plurality did not attribute any weight to the
distinction. Justice Stevens, concurring, did. He expressed the. concern that to find
Mobile's form of government unconstitutional would spawn endless challenges to many
forms of municipal government now widely employed. 446 U.S. at 92 n.14, 93 (1980).
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Given this predictable majority voting stance, the multi-member/at-
large election structure eliminated any possibility that a minority-
supported candidate could be elected.
Factual distinctions between the cases on the issue of apparent
political participation are of questionable significance. In White
evidence indicated that the minority groups recently had been
denied access to the ballot and to the candidate slating process,
whereas the trial court in Mobile found that blacks could register
and vote freely and that no slating process existed. If, however,
state-constructed barriers to balloting and running for office had
been the gravamen of the complaint in White, the remedy was cer-
tainly out of line with the offense; these barriers could easily have
been removed without dismantling the election structure. Surely the
White court had more in mind when it referred to "participation in
the political process."
The evidence in Mobile indicated that blacks were as effectively
excluded from participation as if they had been denied the ballot.
Clearly the election of their proportion of favorable candidates is
not the only indication of a group's equal political participation. The
ability to deliver a "bloc" of votes in support of a candidate as a
bargaining chip in political negotiations may well constitute mean.
ingful political access. Arguably, in the political arena blacks are no
different from other political groups if they can form alliances with
these groups and if their votes must be courted by competing candi..
dates with promises of concern for black interests. However, the
district court found no such situation in Mobile, where blacks were
unable to form alliances. Moreover, any candidate who demonstrated
concern for black interests and actively solicited black votes was
likely to lose enough white support to be defeated.19
The general rule of.candidates elected to ignore black interests
provided additional evidence of the lack of impact blacks had on
Mobile's political process."' While the Court in White viewed similar
unresponsiveness as evidence of denied access,"0' the Mobile plural-
ity discounted it completely. The solution to discrimination by city
officials proposed in Mobile was a suit to outlaw the discrimination,
rather than to replace the election system with one compelling
greater responsiveness. 2 Regardless of the theoretical possibilities
199. 423 F. Supp. at 388.
200. Id at 388-89.
201. 412 U.S. at 766-70.
202. 446 U.S. at 73-74.
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for the political influence of a cohesive minority, when a concrete
situation is presented where the group cannot elect a candidate, is
not able to join with other groups to influence election outcomes,
and poses no political threat to officials who ignore its interest, the
net effect of the minority's "participation" is zero.
2. Denial of access in White was the product of intentional
discrimination, whereas in Mobile, any limitation on political partici-
pation was a mere consequence of legitimate state action. If no
meaningful distinctions may be made in the degree of political par-
ticipation by the affected groups in White and Mobile, the next
possible ground for reconciliation is that the denied access in White
was intentional while the same denial in Mobile was incidental.
Again, a basis for this distinction is difficult to find in the opinions.
If the evidence in White supported an unarticulated premise that
the circumstances indicated an intent to discriminate, a similar con-
clusion in Mobile is difficult to avoid."0 3
Even if denial of access to registration, balloting and slating in
White is seen as evidence of a continuing scheme to discriminate,
the absence of these tactics in Mobile should not negate a discrimin-
atory purpose in the maintenance of a similar election structure.
The majority vote requirement coupled with the at-large election
feature and predictable racial bloc voting by the white majority ade-
quately prevented the election of black supported candidates. Addi-
tion of other discriminatory tactics was unnecessary and would have
jeopardized elections needlessly.
3. Evidence sufficient to infer discriminatory intent in the
selection of the multi-member districting plan in White was insuffi-
cient to establish a similar implication in the maintenance of the at-
large plan in Mobile. The multi-member districts in White had been
adopted recently, whereas the at-large plan in Mobile had been
203. In an amicus curiae brief filed in a dilution case on appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
the Justice Department attempted a reconciliation of White and Mobile. White,
reasoned the Department, should be seen as a "remedy" case, while Mobile can best be
analyzed as a "violation" case. Analogizing from the Court's decisions in the school
desegregation cases and drawing upon the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434. U.S. 968
(1977), the Department maintained that when a defendant has violated the constitu-
tional rights of a group of persons, a remedy that restores the group to the position
they would have enjoyed but for the violation is appropriate. Thus, proof of a past
history of racial discrimination in the voting area is a sufficient violation to compel the
jurisdiction to adopt an election system that avoids perpetuating the effects of that
discrimination on black voters. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lodge v.
Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981).
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adopted years ago under circumstances not suggestive of a discrim-
inatory purpose. Finding this distinction important implies the
following: evidence that is sufficient to establish a discriminatory
purpose in the adoption of an election system is insufficient to
establish a discriminatory purpose in the maintenance of a similar
system. This distinction is neither suggested by the plurality nor
logically supportable. Arguably, the refusal to change the system in
Mobile actually provides stronger evidence of a discriminatory
motive because more blatant discriminatory tactics were no longer
feasible and the effect of the at-large system was clear. In White,
political participation by minorities was effectively stymied by other
tactics, and the effect of multimember districts could only be antici-
pated. Furthermore, this reasoning suggests that a political subdivi-
sion with the foresight to select a system many years ago that now
nullifies minority political participation can maintain this system
with little fear of challenge.
Because the factual distinctions between White and Mobile fail
to provide a satisfactory basis for the difference in their outcomes,
the plurality's decision apparently has overruled White. After retro-
spectively defining White and Whitcomb as "intentional" discrimin-
ation cases and holding that the Constitution does not protect
against the voting dilution alleged in those cases absent an illicit
motive, the plurality predictably rejected Justice Marshall's argu-
ment that the racial dilution case had its genesis in the malappor-
tionment cases:
The dissenting opinion erroneously discovers the asserted en-
titlement to group representation within the "one person one
vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims .... There can be, of course,
no claim that [this] principle has been violated in this case,
because Mobile is a unitary election district .... It is therefore
obvious that nobody's vote had been "diluted" in the sense in
which that word was used in the Reynolds case."'4
Instead of recognizing the lack of "group representation" as merely
evidence that members of the group-individually and collectively--
are being fenced out of the political process, the plurality framed
"group representation" as the interest being proclaimed. Thus
characterized, one might easily agree that no such interest is en-
titled to protection under the Reynolds v. Sims rationale.
Justice Marshall's position, however, is quite different. He
204. 446 U.S. at 77-78.
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argued that the interest involved is not the right to proportional
representation, but rather the right to an equally effective vote in
the election of representatives, the right to full and effective partici-
pation in the political process. Any alleged deprivation of this fun-
damental right should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny without
a showing of discriminatory intent."5 This right is identified and pro-
tected in Reynolds. The difference between racial dilution and mal-
apportionment is not, maintained Marshall, a difference in the in-
terest being asserted but rather in the means by which the interest
is being infringed. In Reynolds,
[t~he Court determined that unequal population distribution ...
was one readily ascertainable means by which this right was
abridged. The Court certainly did not suggest, however, that
violation of the right to effective political participation mattered
only if they were caused by malapportionment. The plurality's
assertion to the contrary in this case apparently would require
it to read Reynolds as recognizing fair apportionment as an end
in itself, rather than as simply a means to protect against vote
diultion."'
Although the cases decided between Reynolds and White refer-
red to racial dilution as if a group right were being asserted... and
the malapportionment decisions spoke in terms of an individual
right,0 ' the interests are very similar. In the racial dilution situa-
tion, a combination of circumstances deprives individual voters of an
effective political voice because they are members of an insular
minority. In the malapportionment situation, individual voters are
deprived of an equally effective vote because they live in an overpop-
ulated district. For the individual voter, the result of racial dilution
is worse than that of malapportionment. Whereas the malappor-
tionment victims' votes count less than those of other voters, dilution
victims' votes do not count at all. Mobile could be compared to a city
with a district of 60,000 people having no representative in the city
government.
The voters in the malapportionment districts are denied full
numerical representation by lines and numbers. The voters in racial
dilution situations are denied representation because their numbers
205. Id at 115-18.
206. Id n.14.
207. See quote from Fortson v. Dorsey, in text accompanying note 120, Part III,
supra.
208. See quote from Reynolds v. Sims, in text accompanying note 116, Part I1,
supra.
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do not count in the political process. In both situations, a political
solution is available only through the "grace" of the elected officials
who are unlikely to "graciously" jeopardize their own political posi-
tion. In short, in both situations the political process is not working
for a substantial portion of the population. The causes of the malfunc-
tion are different, but the resulting deprivation is similar.
V. DILUTION AS AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE VALUE OF THE
RIGHT TO VOTE
"(D]emocracy is largely measured in terms of the ability
of all groups to participate in the process of alliance
building. Surely the purest theories of majoritarian
democracy presuppose fair representation for minorities




The plurality opinion in Mobile cannot be reconciled with White,
nor with the principles suggested by its predecessors, Reynolds v.
Sims, Fortson and Burns; however, those cases may represent a
mode of analysis no longer justified. Perhaps, in light of changed
social and political reality, the discriminatory impact test of White
should be abandoned for the more legislature-respecting discrimina-
tory purpose test. In 1970 judicial intervention in the political pro-
cess was clearly necessary to assure effective political participation
for impotent minority groups that recently had been the object of
blatant and pervasive discrimination.
On the other hand, in 1980, fifteen years after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act, cases of blatant discrimination are rare. Black of-
fice holders are prevalent throughout the nation, including the
South. Blacks votes frequently provide the margin of victory in im-
portant elections. In the face of this evidence of political power, one
might ask how can blacks continue to view themseslves as "wards of
the court," free to seek insulation from the uncertainties inherent in
politics. The political process is trusted to accommodate the coni-
peting interests of Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conser-
vatives, urbanities and farmers, why not blacks and whites?
The answer is easy. If the political process is accommodating the
interests of minority groups, leave it alone; where "Black Power" is
a reality (or alternatively, where it is as meaningless as "Smith
Power") judicial intervention is not justified. The political exclusion
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of blacks that was the rule in 1970 may be the exception in 1981.
But when the exception is proved, a remedy should be provided. The
conspicuous absence of black elected officials in a substantial
number of municipalities of the Deep South, particularly those hav-
ing election structures frequently associated with dilution, may in-
dicate the "exception" is still prevalent.
This portion of the article answers the questions not adequately
addressed by White and its progeny: What should be protected in a
dilution suit and why? In the first section dilution from a factual
standpoint is defined. The second section explains why dilution de-
prives minorities of the value of the right to vote. Mechanisms for
judicial review are examined in the third section, and appropriate
remedies for dilution are considered in the final section.
B. Dilution Defined
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker v. Carr, challenged
the majority to explain why "dilution" was bad:
Talk of "debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk. One cannot
speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote until
there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a vote
should be worth.2"
In this writing the concern is not precisely with the value of a
vote, but rather with the value of the right to vote. Although the
right to vote may have inherent symbolic value, for the individual
its practical value comes from the ability to join a vote with those of
others to influence election outcomes and ultimately the legislative
process. If in political reality a particular group's chances of influ-
encing the outcome of elections are predictably slim, the combined
votes of the group will be given little weight in the legislative
balancing process.
Dilution is a shorthand expression for the exclusion from the
political process of a substantial portion of a governmental unit's
qualified electors. For an individual voter, dilution is brought about
by the interaction of several factors.
(1) Involuntary membership in a cognizable minority group. A
"group" for purposes of the proposed dilution definition is defined
both by internal and external recognition of its existence. The group
members "are viewed as a group; they view themselves as a group;
their identity is in large part determined by membership in the
group; their social status is linked to the status of the group; and
209. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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much of our action, institutional and personal, is based on these
perspectives."2 Generally, membership in the group, and the con-
tinuation of the group status, is not a matter of choice. The
members' shared concerns, including political ones, are also a func-
tion of group status, and as such are largely involuntary. (As a
group blacks are concerned, for example, with police brutality,
substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems
fall disproportionately upon the group). That blacks in the South in
the past have been a cognizable minority should require no proof.
Justice Stewart suggested in Mobile that any notion of "group
representation" could not be cabined. He questioned how a "political
group" would be defined. However, his question misses the point. A
cognizable minority group for purposes of dilution is only second-
arily a political group. A cognizable minority group is a political
group only because the predominant group-defining characteristic
prevails over all other labels the individual group members may
have in the minds of the majority."' At any rate, finding a cognizable
minority is only the beginning of the inquiry.
(2) A pervasive antigroup attitude on the part of the minority
which is manifested in anti-group behavior, particularly political
behavior. Membership in certain groups is undoubtedly a benefit in
many situations. However, blacks receive few advantages from their
group status. In the past, the anti-black attitude of the majority had
been translated into discriminatory behavior which has had linger-
ing effects on the ability of blacks to participate in the political pro-
cess on the same basis as other citizens." 2 Discrimination has
210. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 107, 148
(1976).
211. The voluntariness of membership, the ease of changing political labels, and the
few non-political consequences flowing from a "Republican" or "Democrat" label
mitigate against recognizing purely political groups as cognizable minorities. When a
person in a group takes on a political label, it is for the purpose of playing politics.
People with political labels are expected to discriminate against rival political parties
with their ballots.
212. Much of the adult population was educated in inferior, segregated schools,
casting them into lower status occupations, and reducing their contacts with influential
others. Prolonged disfranchisement deprived blacks of the opportunity to gain the
political experience needed to wage sophisticated campaigns, and to engage in the
"horse trading" of politics. Segregated housing patterns have helped to perpetuate
segregation of social and religious institutions.
Not all groups whose group identifying characteristic may be viewed unfavorably
by non-group members have suffered similar disadvantages. For example, while
members of the Gay Alliance may often be the objects of discrimination because they
are gay, the discrimination suffered generally has not deprived gays of the education,
skills, and contacts needed to participate in politics or to utilize their groups status in
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isolated the group members thereby limiting their informal contacts
with others with whom they might discover common interests, and
form alliances. In short, the group still exists largely (and for the
most part not through choice) as a separate society, with few
business, social, or family ties outside the group.
However, the majority's anti-group attitude does not necessarily
mean that the group is not a force with which to be reckoned by
those trying to create a political majority. Even if the group has
negative status, its size and vote potential may be such that anti-
group political behavior cannot take place realistically. Unfortunate-
ly, however, single party politics and non-partisan elections often
allow race to be a unifying factor, and anti-black attitudes can be
translated into anti-black political behavior.
(3) An election structure which insulates the processes leading
to election from the impact of the group's vote. A permanent minori-
ty in the political process can be created only if (a) the non-minority
interest groups are united in their opposition to the group and can-
didates sympathetic to its interest; and (b) the election structure is
such that the group's numbers are insufficient to elect a candidate
of their choice without support from outside the group. When the
election structure allows for black votes to be ignored, contestants
are unlikely to seek black support or to wish to the identified with
black interests. Legislatures elected without black support are not
beholden politically to the black community, nor need they fear that
ignoring their interest will result in defeat in the future.
(4) An election structure which insulates as well those elected
by the system from the influence of the group. The most difficult
part of a dilution suit from an evidentiary perspective, and in terms
of finding an appropriate standard, is determining whether the
legislators elected are immune from the minority's influence. If the
group's interest can be agreed upon, then perhaps a showing that
they are in fact being ignored is possible, but the problems of proof
are obvious. The other elements of dilution-a cognizable minority,
subject to abuse by the majority, rendered powerless by an election
system which maximizes the majority's antigroup behavior-should
lead to the presumption that legislators elected by such a system
will ignore, if not treated adversely, the interests of the group. This
presumption should shift the burden of proof to the state to show
that despite the appearance of exclusion, the group is receiving the
benefit of its numbers in the political process. A truly interested
the political process. See the discussion of gay political power in Houston in News-
week, Aug. 10, 1981, at 29.
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legislator should be able to identify the predominant interests of
such a substantial group of his constituents and explain how he has
responded to their needs.213 The ultimate proof of exclusion comes
from a demonstration that the group's needs and interests are not
receiving attention and consideration in the legislative process to
the same degree as those of other voters.
Despite the problems of proof, responsiveness is crucial. The
most often accepted rationale for finding the right to vote funda-
mental is its centrality in assuring the benefits of citizenship to the
voters; people who have a hand in selecting those who make the
laws and who dole out government services are not likely to be vic-
tims of government action, or shortchanged on the benefits. If the
group and its members are, for whatever reason, receiving as many
of the benefits of citizenship as are other citizens of the govern-
mental unit, they are receiving the full value of their right to vote.
If they are not, the value of their right is zero, even if their votes
are counted like everybody else's.
True, responsiveness is an illusive but not unworkable concept;
the difficulty of proof is partially alleviated for the plaintiff by shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendant. The test is an objective
rather than subjective "in the eyes of the voter" standard. Respon-
siveness must be evaluated in terms of the functions the particular
city government performs. Slightly over-simplified the government's
primary roles are (1) to make policy through ordinances, zoning deci-
sions, etc., and (2) to implement policy and keep the city functioning
by spending money.
The city should be required to demonstrate that the group's in-
terests are being considered when policies are made and imple-
mented. Some evidence of black involvement in the process is the
number of blacks in policymaking positions, typically advisory
boards and high level city jobs. (The latter is particularly important
because many important policies are made administratively in the
daily functioning of the city.) The city should also demonstrate that
the policies actually implemented reflect concern for the group's in-
terest. The decision to build more art museums rather than health
213. The suggestion that if the state is able to establish "responsiveness," dilution
should not be found will be the least acceptable part of this proposed dilution standard
for civil rights advocates. The anticipated objection is two-fold. First, "responsiveness"
is an unworkable concept as an expression of opinion by the voters. Minority voters
have already expressed their opinion on the responsiveness of those serving by con-
sistently not voting for them. Second, if the legislature is being responsive for any
reason other than because of political clout of the group (such as to keep them from
winning a dilution suit) then the group is not a genuine participant in the political pro-
cess. At best it has changed from being a ward of the court to being a ward of the
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centers may be more important than the number of art museums
built in black and white neighborhoods. The position most favorable
to black interests must not always prevail; rather, the legislature
should demonstrate that the group's interest was understood and
weighed with those concerns of others.
One of the most important decisions a government makes is to
choose the method of its own election. When that selection consis-
tently denies a large segment of the city its choice, some justifica-
tion should be required. One might ask whether at-large elections
may be justified. The justification that when the entire city votes
for all of the lawmakers "rotten boroughs" are avoided because all
representatives must be responsive to all areas fails if none of the
legislators are responding to the needs of a large segment of the city's
electorate. The justification of a desire to have a majority of the
voters elect all the representatives is also not persuasive if it has
resulted in a permanent minority. However, the choice of method of
election is a single legislative decision. When the minority's interest
in electing "some. of its own" is balanced against other interests,
perhaps the legislature can justify the choice. Furthermore, proof of
responsiveness in other areas may sufficiently compensate for a
decision against minority interest in the selection of the election
procedures.
The argument that responsiveness should be evidence of influ-
ence only if it comes in response to the actual power of the group in-
stead of by virtue of the grace of the legislature also must fail. Find-
ing the motives of legislators is a speculative endeavor when the
sought-after motive is supported by action which would be consis-
tent with that motive (discriminating impact/discriminatory motive).
How much more speculative will it be to try to ascribe "bad" motive
for having reached a desirable result? If "responsiveness" is found is
it not just possible that blacks have decided to forego supporting
candidates who would like their support and would consider their
needs in order to pursue a different goal-that of electing a black
candidate? That situation perhaps then resembles a claim, not for ef-
fective political participation, but for proportional representation.
When the first three factors have been established, and the city
is unable to demonstrate responsiveness, the political process can be
declared "malfunctioning." A significant group of the electorate has
been deprived of the benefit of their collective vote in a way which
others who are political losers have not. In short the group has been
"fenced out" and are left without a political solution to their dilemma.
legislature. These are very persuasive objection, but in order to be true to the value of
the right being asserted, they must be rejected.
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Changing the election system to assure the election of minority
candidates admittedly will not guarantee responsiveness. So long as
a majority of those elected remain antagonistic toward the minority,
the minority's elected officials may be unable to further the repre-
sentational interest of the group. In the.face of a clearly unrespon-
sive government, however, the group's position is improved by having
considerable influence over even a minority of the legislators rather
than no influence over any. Even a single group spokesman will
have more influence over legislative thought and action than no
group spokesman. If, however, the government can establish that
the elected officials are in fact giving due respect to the group's in-
terest changing the method of election by judicial fiat may be no
more than speculative tampering.
The view expressed here of the underlying evil of dilution is not
original. From the dicta in the pre-White cases through Mobile the
underlying premise was that the votes of the group were being
cancelled out. Missing, however, was an explanation of why the evi-.
dence in the cases did or did not equal a cancellation. The White-
Zimmer factors relied upon by the courts of the Fifth Circuit, while
relevant to the inquiry, should be re-examined to see where they fit
in the dilution formula proposed here: A past history of discrimina..
tion is indicative of the group's status as a cognizable minority, as
well as the anti-group attitude of the majority. Many of the factors
(large districts, majority vote and anti-single shot requirements)
are evidence that the election system will allow, racial bloc voting to
eliminate the influence of the group on the election process. Lack of
access to the slating process and/or racial bloc voting are indicative
of the majority's 'anti-group attitude translated into anti-group
political behavior. Unresponsiveness is proof that the system has
succeeded in cancelling out the votes of the group.2 ' A cognizable
minority, racial bloc voting (or an evidentiary equivalent) and unres.
ponsiveness are crucial to the determination. The various com.
ponents of the election system are more fungible, and their influence
in the exclusion process is determined by the degree of racial polari.
zation, and the minority's percentage of the electorate." 5 Thus the
Fifth Circuit view that some "aggregate of factors" proved dilution
was incorrect. The particular aggregate is crucial.
214. The Zimmer factor, "a tenuous state policy underlying the perference for
multi-member or at-large districts," does not really fit. Such a finding is some evidence
of a discriminatory intent in the selection of the election system and also negates any
strong state interest in the selection which might justify infringement upon a constitu-
tionally protected right.
215. Even at-large elections or multi-member districts are not essential to a finding
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C. Dilution As A Denial of The Right To Vote *
In addition to failing to define dilution, the cases following
White did not satisfactorily explain the constitutional basis for the
claim. The assumption was that dilution infringed upon the right to
vote, but the basis for the assumption was not articulated.
With the exception of the reapportionment decisions, most cases
raising the issue of the denial of the right to vote presented no ques-
tion as to the scope of the right. These decisions involved actual
restrictions on the franchise, either total exclusion of certain people
as potential voters,11 requirements that had to be met before any-
one could qualify as a voter,"7 or limitations on who could be a voter
in a particular election."8 Thus if there is a "right to vote," it clearly
was infringed in those cases." ' The focus of most decisions instead
was upon the source of the right, or upon the state's interest in the
infringing legislation. Despite the lack of a clear constitutional basis
for providing protection (aside from the fifteenth amendment) the
Supreme Court since Baker v. Carr has subjected to strict scrutiny
anything it recoginzed as an infringement on the "right."2 The
Mobile plurality avoided following these cases by declaring the right
to vote not to be involved.
of dilution. Single member districts all drawn so that blacks need white support to
elect a candidate also allows racial bloc voters to exclude minorities. See Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
216. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (residents of a federal
enclave); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (member of the armed forces).
217. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (a durational residency re-
quirement); Haper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax in state
elections); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
(upholding the literacy test as a prerequisite to registration).
218. See, e.g., Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (limiting voters in
general obligation bond elections to property taxpayers); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (limiting voters in school board election to property owners
or to parents with children enrolled in the local public schools); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1968) (limiting voters in public utility revenue bond election to
property tax payers).
219. One interesting case where the franchise clearly was not involved, but where
nonetheless the Court decided the right to vote had been infringed is Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In that case the Court held unconstitutional a law which
would have denied George Wallace access to the Ohio 1968 presidential ballot. The
Court held that restrictions on who may appear on a state's general election ballot are
a burden on "the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
cast their votes effectively." 393 U.S. at 30.
220. The oft-cited language from Yick Wo notwithstanding, the constitutional
status of the "right" has been the subject of much debate. See, R. BERGER, GOVERN.
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Ironically, in the apportionment cases, where no claim of denied
franchise could be made, the Court recognized the right to vote as a
"preferred freedom" under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment." Even in these opinions the Court avoided
answering Mr. Justice Frankfurter's challenge to define "the value
of a vote." Emerging from these cases, however, is a principle that
any device which impairs the value of voting impairs the right to
vote. Through voting all other rights are preserved. If the ultimate
value of voting is to secure the full rights and benefits of citizen-
ship, anything which prevents this for a cognizable group of voters
infringes upon the "value" of the right.
A voter in an overpopulated district has the value of his "right"
diminished because his influence over the election of his represen-
tative is only a fraction of that of voters in other districts. An in-
dividual member of a minority group, however, has no influence over
the election of his nominal representatives, because his vote, along
with those of others in the group, has been fenced out of the elec-
tion process by the dilution factors. In the legislative process, the
group's interests are not being afforded the benefit of their
numbers. Thus, not only are their particularized needs (those not
shared by the majority of non-group members) not attended, but
when their interests conflict with those of other segments of the
population, they lose more often than other groups of equivalent
numerical strength.
The consequences of being the permanent minority in the
political process is worse for blacks and other cognizable minorities
than for residents of over-populated districts, or even other per-
renial losers in politics. City dwellers of over-populated districts suf-
fered when their interests were persistently out-voted by rural rep-
resentatives. This outcome was likely when there was a perceived
conflict between urban and rural interests. In terms of critical legis-
lative expenditures, the urban areas whose legislators had less clout
were no doubt significantly short-changed. On other issues, however,
the possibility of the rural dominated legislature passing legislation
which impacted disproportionately upon city dwellers was diminish-
ed by the overlap in rural and urban interests. The people elected to
MENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Van
Aistyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and The Understanding of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33. See generally, Le Clercq, The
Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. REV. 607 (1975).
221. See Casper, Apportionment and the Right To Vote: Standards of Judicial
Scrutiny, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 5.
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the legislature looked and thought more like urbanites than they
looked and thought unlike them.
Similarly, individual Republicans are seldom significantly disad-
vantaged by having an all-Democratic legislature. Political phil-
osophies aside, the difference between individuals who vote Democrat
and those who vote Republican are not such that they can be singled
out by the legislature. Action benefiting Democrats will probably
benefit their Republican neighbors. Since the Republican voters look
so much like the Democratic legislators it is very unlikely that any
legislation (other than that perpetuating partisan advantages) will
have a negative impact on the Republicans.
Qualitatively the injury suffered by blacks at the hands of an all-
white legislature was of a different magnitude. Blacks in urban
areas in the South did not have their children sent to segregated
schools because they were living in malapportioned districts, nor
were they relegated to sitting in the back of the bus because they
were not members of the Democratic party. Blacks were discrimin-
ated against because they were black and because the lawmakers
were white. Even if today white legislators are restrained from pass-
ing discriminatory laws, they can continue to be insensitive to the
needs of minorities and to the negative impact of certain legislation
with no fear of suffering adverse personal consequences (the law
will not impact negatively on them) or adverse political conse-
quences (most of their supporters will not be affected).
Thus, the actual impact of dilution on the minority voter is far
greater than the impact of malapportionment on the city dweller.
Unless the Court is intent upon exalting form over substance, it
must recognize that sometimes casting an equally weighted ballot
does not preserve the value of the right to vote. Likewise, victims of
dilution are not like others whose candidates did not win. These
voters lose much more than the election.
D. . The Mechanisms of Judicial Review
The choice of the form of government and the method of elect-
ing that government are certainly matters better left to the legisla-
ture. Why, then, should it ever be acceptable for the judiciary to
second guess such a sensitive legislative decision? Much has been
written recently about the proper role of judicial review in a demo-
cratic society. 2 To consider all the bases currently being suggested
222. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
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for determining the appropriate level of judicial review and to ex-
amine their application to the legislative action being questioned in
a dilution suit is beyond the scope of this article. Instead what
follows is a consideration of the appropriateness of using heightened
judicial scrutiny in dilution cases, first as an application of fun-
damental rights analysis, and second under the "respresentation-
reinforcing" model of judicial review, proposed by Constitutional
theorist John Hart Ely. Next the inappropriateness of the intent re-
quirement of dilution cases is discussed, followed by a suggestion for
refocusing the search for intent, if the element is seen as essential.
Fundamental Rights Analysis. The Mobile plurality recognized
that "a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or im-
plicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitution-
al." 23 The plurality agreed that voting is a fundamental right, citing
with approval cases so holding," and accepted that "the Equal Pro-
tection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections
on an equal basis with other qualified voters.""22 However, it avoided
the application of strict scrutiny in Mobile by declaring the right to
vote not to be involved in this case because the trial court found
"Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hindrance.' "226
Clearly the Court's decisions in the voting area are less than a
seamless web, and Mobile compounds the confusion. While apparent-
ly conceding no need to show intent when a fundamental right is in-
volved, and arguably that the right to vote is fundamental, the
plurality made an interesting analysis of the fifteenth amendment:
"[The] Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial
or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote 'on account of
race . . . .' " For support Justice Stewart cited Wright v.
Rockefeller22 as a fifteenth amendment case requiring intent.
Wright, in fact involved a claim of intentional racially discriminatory
districting. However, no claim was made that anyone, black or other-
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); L. LUSKY,
BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CON-
STITUTION (1975); Symposium: Judicial Review versaus Democracy, 42 OHIO S. L.J. 1
(1981).
223. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980).
224. Id. at 77 n.25.
225. Id. at 77.
226. Id. at 65.
227. Id.
228. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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wise, was being denied the right to cast a ballot for some congress-
man. If the plaintiffs had established a discriminatory motive then
presumably they would have prevailed. Thus even though district-
ing (at-large elections are a form of districting) does not involve the
right to vote (Mobile), discriminatory districting will violate the fif-
teenth amendment (Wright), which by its very language applies only
to denials or abridgments of the right to vote. If taken literally, the
plurality's holding in Mobile, its apparent approval of Reynolds and
the voter qualification cases, its discussion of the fifteenth amend-
ment, plus the holding of City of Rome v. United States,' decided
the same day as Mobile, establish three different "rights to vote,"
all having a different scope and all afforded different "protection."
First is the "right" which is fundamental, afforded the highest pro-
tection. Second is the "right" under the fifteenth amendment which
is protected only against intentional discrimination (the scope is
broader, but the protection more limited than the first). Third is the
"right" under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act which is protected
against both discriminatory intent and effect (here the scope is the
broadest and the protection the greatest, but the "right" is only
available under a limited set of circumstances).
Despite the Mobile plurality's less than lucid treatment of the
proper degree of judicial protection to be afforded the right to vote,
strict scrutiny should be available under traditional fundamental
rights analysis, or if race were involved, under the fifteenth amend-
ment. Thus, the more difficult task is not to convince a majority of
the court that voting is fundamental, but that dilution actually ex-
ists, and robs the right of its value.
Representation-Reinforcing Review. Probably no further "justi-
fication" for heightened judicial review is needed if one agrees that
the dilution can infringe upon the right to vote. Confusion over the
interest asserted in Mobile was evident, however, not only in the
plurality's opinion, but also in those opinions of other members of
the Court who believe "intent" to be an essential element of a dilu-
tion suit. 3 Perhaps the appropriate question is not can the right to
vote encompass the dilution plaintiff's interest, but rather, when
dilution is present, is the democratic process so broken that judicial
repair is needed? Instead of focusing on whether the choice of elec-
229. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
230. See 446 U.S. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 94-95 (White, J., dissenting);
id. at 136-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion structure is denying certain voters the right to vote, perhaps
the operation of the system that produces the legislature should be
examined. If the system is not working properly, maybe correcting
the system, rather than monitoring its abuse (as suggested by the
Mobile plurality)," ' is the proper solution.
Professor Ely in' his recent book Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 8' proposes as an alternative to the
judicial role of protecting "fundamental values" that the judiciary
act as guardian of the process of representation. Ely draws heavily
upon two of Justice Stone's categories from the famous Carolene
Products footnote." More exacting judicial scrutiny is proper when:
(1) the legislation involved "restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable leg-
islation,"' z or (2) the legislation is based on "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities."8 5 Professor Ely reformulates these
ideas to suggest that judicial policing is needed when a democratic
malfunction occurs. This result occurs when the process is unde-
serving of trust:
(1) [Tihe ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or
(2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, represen-
tatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically dis-
advantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a preju-
dicial refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby
denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system. " '
Ely does not deal specifically with racial dilution, and in fact
seems to suggest that as a group blacks possess political power.237
231. 446 U.S. at 73.
232. (1980).
233. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
234. 1d.
235. Id
236. Ely, supra note 232, at 103.
237. Id. at 152. It is not clear whether he is suggesting they have power, or only
that they appear to have power. He discusses the impact of the black vote on the elec-
tion of Jimmy Carter as evidence of the ability of blacks to pool their political interest
with those of others, but then suggests that protection for blacks (and others) is need-
ed because "the minority in question [is] barred from the pluralist's bazaar, and thus
keeps finding itself on the wrong end of the legislature's classifications, for reasons
that in some sense are discreditable." Id.
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By reference to the "ins" choking out the "outs" he has in mind the
malapportionment cases"38 and the voter qualification cases: "We
cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out, and it is therefore in-
cumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the
vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there
will be) it had better be a very convincing one."" 9 Ely would provide
heightened judicial concern even if a minority group appeared to
have political power, if that group were the object of widespread
hostility and if the legislation in question fell more heavily upon the
group than upon the group to which the majority of the legislators
themselves belonged."'
Despite his failure to address the subject, dilution under Ely's
theory packs a double punch. The legislation involved assures that
the outs will stay out (even if some ins trade places with the other
ins). Furthermore. those who are being kept out are the very people
for whom the legislature is least likely to have any genuine concern.
They are the people upon whom the action of the legislature had im-
pacted negatively in the past. They are, by the proposed dilution
definition, objects of widespread hostility. This particular legislation
(choice of the method of election) interacts with the hostility for the
group to make them permanent outsiders in the political process.
The decisions (including the one concerning the rules governing
their own selection) of a legislature which has insulated itself from
the influence of a cognizable segment of the electorate lack legiti-
macy, and can be subjected to judicial scrutiny without concern that
this review will be inconsistent with the American system of repre-
sentative democracy. 4 ' If the government is to be a representative
democracy, the rules of the political process must be fundamentally
fair. This fairness must be judged in the context of the political and
social reality of the rules' application. Rules that assure the persis-
tent exclusion of a significant group of voters fail the fairness test.
The reasons for requiring intent in other equal protection cases
are not appropriate in a dilution case. In Washington v. Davis242 the
Court explained why a discriminatory purpose is essential to an
equal protection case. If disproportionate impact alone were suffi-
cient to suggest the legislature's use of a suspect classification, thus
triggering strict scrutiny, a whole range of legislation would lose its
238. 1d. at 120.
239. Id.
240. Id. at Ch. 6.
241. 1d. at 101-02.
242. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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presumption of constitutionality."' Facially neutral, otherwise rea-
sonable acts of legislators burdening one race more than another
will lose their presumption of constitutionality only upon proof of a
racially discriminatory purpose.
This reasoning is simply not applicable to dilution claims. Prop-
erly conceptualized, a dilution claim is not a claim that legislation
has a discriminatory impact on minorities. Rather it is a claim the
political process itself is illegitimate. Chief Justice Warren in
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 1524. explained succintly
the reason for potent judicial review:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "ra-
tional" classifications in other types of enactments are based on
an assumption that the institutions of state government are
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However,
when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this
basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the
basis for presuming constitutionality.45
To ask the winners of the election about the fairness of the contest
simply makes no sense.
A refocusing of the intent requirement. If a majority of the
Court refuses to interpret the illusive right to vote to include the
dilution situation and rejects all other reasons to avoid the intent re-
quirements, at least it should look for a discriminatory intent that
has more relevance to the fact of dilution than does the subjective
motivation of those who selected the method of election under at-
tack. In Mobile Justice Stewart rejected the Fifth Circuit view that
presence of White-Zimmer factors is circumstantial evidence of a
racially discriminatory intent:
[Unresponsiveness is) only ... the most tenuous and circumstan-
tial evidence of the constitutional invalidity of the electoral
system under which they attained their offices. . . . [Plast dis-
crimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn gov-
ernmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate ques-
tion remains whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in
a given case .... [Election features that cancel out Negro votes]
tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority. . . . They
are far from proof that the at-large electoral scheme represents
243. Id. at 248.
244. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
245. Id. at 628.
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purposeful discrimination against Negro voters. ' .
To the extent that these factors tend to prove that whoever
selected or maintained Mobile's election structure did so with a sub-
jective motive to exclude blacks, Justice Stewart's assessment is no
doubt correct. However, the problem with his approach and that of
the court of appeals is that they are looking for intent in the wrong
place. Unlike Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, where a
single decision (or at most a set of decisions) produced the complain-
ed of harm, dilution is not the product of a single legislative act.
Furthermore, a determination of who. made the decision as to the
method of election might not even be possible. Could the city com-
pletely immunize the process from judicial review by allowing the
voters to select the election method? If the method of election is
mandated by local legislation enacted by the state legislature is it
the motives of that body which count, or those of the local legisla-
tive delegation, or those of the city governing body which requested
the legislation? '
Dilution plaintiffs attack at-large elections as responsible for the
problem, but such arguments are made largely because the non-
structural dilution factors are not easily remedied by court action.
When the Supreme Court "added" the intent requirement to equal
protection claims, it was natural to look for the discriminatory in-
tent in the adoption or maintenance of the method of election. The
method of election is, however, only one of the factors that produces
exclusion from the political process. "But for" the other factors, both
the group and its members would receive the same benefits and suf-
fer the same disadvantages as everyone else. If state originated or
fostered intentional discrimination can be found in the remaining
factors essential to the proposed dilution definition-and surely it
can"'4-dilution should not be justified because one of the causative
246. 446 U.S. at 74.
247. An additional problem is presented by a choice made many years ago, as was
the case with the Mobile system, adopted in 1911. !s a law adopted for a
discriminatory purpose fifty years ago sanitized if it is currently being maintained for
a legitimate one? What if the situation is reversed? Can a law admittedly adopted
originally for a discriminatory purpose be saved if it is re-enacted for a legitimate pur-
pose?
248. The past official discrimination essential to the creation of a "cognizable
minority" was unquestionably "intentional." The current lack of resources for effective
political participation by the group can be traced directly to past intentional
discrimination by the state. The creation of the all-white primary, and thus one party
politics, was undeniably part of a plan to deprive blacks of the right to vote. The
absence of a viable two party system increases the ease with which black voters may
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factors cannot be proved to be the product of a discriminatory
motive. A possible neutral motive for selecting and maintaining all
or part of the election system should not be permitted to "sanitize"
from heightened judicial review the exclusion effected by all the
dilution factors in concert."9
E. Remedies for Dilution
The remedy adopted upon proof of dilution should eliminate
those aspects of the election process which promote the exclusion of
blacks. Thus the solution must generally address one of the struc-
tural dilution factors, since an end to racial bloc voting cannot be
mandated. The relief typically requested in a dilution suit is a
change of the method of election to single member districts. The
assumption underlying the selection of this remedy is that single
member districts in combination with segregated housing patterns,
almost inevitably produce some black legislators.
Whether all single member districts, a mixed plan, or some
other modification will best cure dilution must be determined on the
particularized facts of the case. A geographically dispersed minority
is not helped by single member districts, but may be by the elimina-
tion of election features which increase the member of votes needed
for election (such as the majority vote and post requirements). De-
pending upon the degree of racial animus of the electorate, a mixed
plan (some officials elected at-large, others by districts) may be pre-
be ignored. "Unresponsiveness" in many instances will smack of intentional neglect, if
not active discrimination. Furthermore, the other discriminatory acts on the part of
the state increase the certainty that those considering retention of the election system
were well aware of the interactional effect of at-large elections and racial bloc voting
on the election of black candidates. While knowledge of impact alone may be insuffi-
cient to establish intent, in combination with the other acts it becomes more per-
suasive: "You have mistreated this group of people in the past. Your present behavior
demonstrates continuing hostility to their interest. You must be aware of the in-
evitable effect of continuing the method of election on the election of the group's can-
didates. It does not stretch credibility to assume a motive for this action consistent
with your past motives." This line of reasoning is particularly appropriate for Mobile
where the form of government, which mandated that election be at-large, is one aban-
doned by most cities as being unworkable. See THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 1979: "While
27 communities report a commission form today, another i24 have shifted from that
form to another." Id. at 105.
249. Nothing here is meant to suggest that when evidence can be adduced to
establish a discriminatory motive behind this particular decision, relief should not also
be granted. A legislative decision to maintain an election system for the purpose and
having the effect of preventing the election of blacks in unconstitutional even if "dilu-
tion" cannot be established.
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ferable because of the incentive for coalition-building in electing the
at-large seats. The mixed plan provides each group (blacks and
whites) with a certain number of representatives where a black/white
choice is unlikely, and thereby eliminates a voter's fear that his only
representative may be someone of the "opposite" race. Perhaps this
assurance would decrease the importance of race for the remaining
at-large seats, and allow for coalition-building across racial lines.
Both "groups" then would have a specific representative who is'
clearly politically beholden to the group, in addition to represen-
tatives over whom the group can exercise some influence. However,
in any given situation chances for coalition-building may be so slight
that creating any at-large seats becomes the equivalent of creating
additional "sure" majority seats. 50
The plaintiffs in Mobile lost Justice Blackmun's vote because the
remedy sought went beyond changing the method of election, to
changing the form of government as well. Why a less drastic
remedy was not considered is not entirely clear from the district
court opinion. Although many commission forms of government call
for each commissioner to perform a specific city-wide function, in
Mobile the commissioners were fungible.25' Having such a small
number of officials elected by single member districts is unusual,
but not otherwise objectionable. Even leaving the at-large elections
intact, eliminating the majority vote and post requirements would
have substantially increased the impact of the black vote, even to
the point of being able to hypothesize election day facts which would
allow the election of a black supported candidate without white
votes.52 Perhaps Justice Blackmun was correct when he noted: "In
failing to consider such alternative plans . . . the District Court was
perhaps overly concerned with the elimination of at-large elections
250. Since proof of dilution establishes that the legislators are not representative
of the city as a whole, there should be no reason to give any special consideration to
their proposed remedies. Both sides should be required to demonstrate the probability
that their proposed remedy will in fact eliminate dilution.
251. See discussion at note 173, supra.
252. The district court may have rejected this possibility on the assumption that
once a districting plan is held unconstitutional and the court is called upon to fashion a
remedy, single member districts are preferred. See note 155, Part III, supra. Proposing
either of these alternatives might have forced both sides to evaluate their true goals.
If actually faced with the prospect of one-third of the city's governing body being
"black," the city might prefer to change to an expanded governing body where any
black elected would have less influence. If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs are really
more interested in electing one of their own than in being full-fledged political par-
ticipants, any proposal which offers less than some certain minority seats may be unac.
ceptable.
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per se, rather than with structuring an electorial system that pro-
vided an opportunity for black voters in Mobile to participate in the
city's government on an equal footing with whites." '253
VI. EPILOGUE: THE FUTURE OF THE DILUTION SUIT
Previous sections of this article argue that Mobile was decided
wrongly and urge reconsideration of the dilution issue. Correctness
notwithstanding, Mobile has for the moment replaced White as the
dilution suit's standard bearer. Whether dilution remains a viable
claim for constitutional relief after Mobile will depend largely upon
the position courts adopt concerning the evidentiary showing neces-
sary to establish a discriminatory motive. The first portion of this
section considers the views expressed by the various members of
the Court on what constitutes discriminatory motive in the context
of a voting case, and also examines the lower court cases applying
Mobile. The next portion examines dilution claims under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. It presents a critical analysis of the Supreme
Court's treatment of dilution in its most recent section 5 decision,
City of Rome, in which the Court reached a result strikingly dif-
ferent from that of Mobile. A final subsection considers whether sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act can fill the gap left between Mobile
and Rome by allowing a dilution claim to be maintained without a
showing of discriminatory intent.
A. The Constitutional Suit I
Regardless of whether the basis for challenge is the fourteenth
amendment or the fifteenth amendment,5 ' only two members of the
Court (Justices Brennan and Marshall) agree that in a dilution suit
the motives of those selecting or maintaining the election structure
are immaterial. Two others (Justices Blackmun and White) agree
that a discriminatory motive is a prerequisite but would find it
established by proof of the White-Zimmer factors. " '
253. 446 U.S. at 82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
254. The plurality's unusual treatment of the fifteenth amendment is discussed in
Part V, supra. See notes 235 & 236 and the accompanying text, supra. Only Justice
Marshall's opinion distinguishes between the standards of the two amendments. He
maintains that regardless of the standard under the fourteenth amendment, the fif-
teenth does not require discriminatory intent. Whether the plurality views "dilution"
as a proper fifteenth amendment claim if intent is shown is not clear. Justice
Blackmun expressed no opinion. The others recognize the claim as proper.
255. Justice White, who is the author of White, interprets the case as an inten-
tional discrimination case. Whether he would "find" intent in the concert of factors (as
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Justice Stevens, while rejecting the Mobile plurality's focus on
the subjective motives, imposes in his "objective effects" analysis
possibly an even more difficult standard. He would find an election
scheme unconstitutional only if it were manifestly not the product
of a routine political decision, had a significant adverse impact on
minorities and was unsupported by any neutral justification."
Under Stevens' test, the many legitimate purposes for adopting an
at-large system, particularly if coupled with a legitimate reason to
change the existing one, would shield the action from attack. 57
The plurality's theory of intent almost requires proof of an ac-
tual subjective, discriminatory motive on the part of those selecting
the election system.sN "Effects" alone will be sufficient evidence of
intent only when they are so dramatic as to negate any other ex-
planation, or when the plaintiff has negated all other explanations.
The plurality expressly rejected the notion that a "tort theory" of
intent would suffice, quoting from Feeney:
"Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences .... It implies
that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."2 9
suggested in Part V), or whether he sees in dilution factors as circumstantial evidence
of the illicit motives of those responsible for selecting at-large elections is not clear. If
his view is the latter, he does not address the problem of whose intent these factors
are evidence. Justice Blackmun leaves open the possibility that "intent" is not essen-
tial: "Assuming that proof of intent is a prerequisite to appellees' prevailing on their
constitutional claim of vote dilution .... " 446 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the result).
256. 446 U.S. at 90.
257. Since Justice Stevens rejects the reasoning of the plurality and believes
motive to be immaterial, he gives little clue as to what standard he would apply to
determine intent. If he concedes that a majority of the Court has concluded intent to
be essential, perhaps he would agree with the dissent that proof of the White-Zimmer
factors allows an inference of discriminatory intent.
258. If the Court literally follows this theory, an election system selected by
referendum would be virtually immune from attack, unless it was so irrational as to
admit to but one interpretation of the purpose for its selection. Even then it would have
to be the offering of that form of government by the legislature, rather than its selec-
tion by the voters, that was irrational.
259. 446 U.S. at 72 n.17. This expression would seem to include a rejection of Pro-
fessor Brest's somewhat similar theory that purposeful discrimination can be founded
upon proof of "selective racial indifference." Under his theory, conscious intent to
discriminate would not be necessary if the legislature would not have taken the action
if the adverse impact would have fallen instead on the members of the dominant
group. The intentional discrimination results from a failure on the part of the
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The plurality does indicate that subjective discriminatory intent
may be established by circumstantial evidence, but provides no
guidance as to what this evidence would be. 6' Two clusters of cases
decided recently by different panels of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals demonstrate the disparity of possible views on the meaning
of Mobile. The decision for plaintiffs in three of six cases, on two
seemingly different theories, indicate that the dilution suit is not
completely dead.
In McMillan v. Escambia County, Florida,2"' plaintiffs attacked
at-large election systems for several local governing bodies. The
Court of Appeals characterized the plaintiffs' complaints as alleging
"that the at-large [election] systems operate to preclude the black
population ... from electing a member of its own race to any of the
three governing bodies."2 2
The Court recognized the intent requirement and analyzed the
plaintiff's "vote dilution" claims by utilizing the factors suggested
by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights for finding improper
motive: (1) The historical background of the action, particularly if a
series of actions have been taken for an invidious purpose; (2) the
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged action;
(3) any procedural sequence; (4) any substantive departure from nor-
mal procedure, ie., whether factors normally considered important
by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
reached; and (5) the legislative history, especially where contem-
porary statements by members of the decisionmaking body exist.26
legislature to accord the same sympathy and care to the minority that it would afford
to the majority as a matter of course. See Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-
Forward: In Defense of The Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976),
discussed in relation to dilution in Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember
Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV.
694, 716 (1978).
260. The record in White easily would have supported a finding of intentional
discrimination. Multi-member districts were a departure from normal state procedure.
They were utilized almost exclusively in areas where single member districts would
almost surely have produced black or Mexican-American districts. They were
employed at a time when it appeared that more blatant discriminatory tactics-such as
keeping minorities from registering-were going to be difficult to continue. The
presence of these strong circumstantial indications of discriminatory intent and the
courts', lower and Supreme, failure to base the decision upon them made it easy for
subsequent interpreters of White to believe that intent was not the gravamen of the
complaint.
261. 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981).
262. Id. at 1240. The court characterized the claim as one of vote dilution. Thus'
what before Mobile was seen as a claim of denied access to the political process has
become a claim of inability to elect a candidate of "their own race."
263. 638 F.2d at 1243 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 at 267-68 (1977)).
[Vol. 42
VOTE DILUTION
The difficulty of applying this analysis to "old" legislation was
apparent when the Court considered the county commission's at-
large system, adopted in 1901. The district court found that blacks
were already disfranchised by that time. Thus no further device to
dilute voting strength was needed."' It was then faced with applying
the Arlington Heights analysis to the legislature's inaction in failing
to change the at-large system. Substituting "inaction" for action in
the Arlington Heights analysis is almost nonsensical. Nonetheless,
the district court found the necessary evidence of discriminatory
motive in the finding that the County Commission twice rejected the
recommendation of its own government committees for a change to
single member districts and from the commissioners' admission that
their rejection of single member districts was motivated by the
desire to maintain their incumbency. From this the district court in-
terpolated that their concern was that they not be replaced by
blacks in subsequent elections.2"5 The Court of Appeals, reversing,
disagreed with this interpolation: "[T]he desire to retain one's in-
cumbency unaccompanied by other evidence ought not to be equated
with an intent to discriminate against blacks qua blacks. 2 8
The Arlington Heights analysis was more helpful in the school
board case. From 1907 until 1945 primary elections for the board
were conducted by single member districts, while the general elec-
tions were at-large. Immediately after all-white primaries were out-
lawed in Florida, the legislature adopted at-large elections for the
primary as well. This sequence of events, coupled with the unex-
plained change in the policy of favoring single member districts was
sufficient justification, though the appellate court, for the conclusion
that the change was racially motivated."1
As to the city council's at-large system, direct evidence of some
of the participants' motives was found. The at-large system was
adopted in the face of rising black political participation, and much
direct evidence was presented that indicated the motive behind the
adoption was to avoid the election of a black. 8
264. In Mobile on remand, nearly four days of trial time were devoted to expert
testimony directed toward the issue of whether the 1911 statute mandating the com-
mission form of government had a discriminatory purpose, even though blacks had
been disfranchised since 1901.
265. 638 F.2d at 1244-45.
266. Id. at 1245.
267. Id. at 1245-46.
268. Id. at 1247. A council member testified that the at-large system was proposed
to avoid the "hassle of reapportioning to keep so many blacks in this ward and so
many whites in that ward and keep the population in balance as to race." Id. A
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Thus, where the method of election in question has been adopted
after the need to "dilute" black voting strength exists, finding a
smoking gun may be possible. The Court of Appeals opinion viewed
the gravamen of the complaint to be the existence of a "discrimina-
tory motive." The value of the right to vote was not important to its
analysis. Of the three governmental bodies involved, the evidence
recounted by the court suggests that the County Commission (the
only one found to be constitutional) was the least likely to afford
black citizens consideration commensurate with their numbers in
the electorate. County elections were characterized by extreme
racial bloc voting, and no black had ever been elected. Before the
trial neither of the other bodies had elected blacks, but one black
was elected to the school board after the trial, and two black council
members initially appointed to the council were reelected. 69
Furthermore, these defendants argued that whites campaigned ac-
tively for black votes and those elected were responsive to the
needs of the black community. The panel found these arguments ir-
relevant. As to the city's argument that the system was no longer
being maintained for invidious reasons, the court noted: "If the
system was unconstitutional at its inception and if it continues to
have the effect it was designed to have, then the pure hearts of the
current council members are immaterial. 27 0
Another panel of the Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning of
Mobile quite differently in Lodge v. Buxton. 7' This panel concluded
that the use of the Zimmer factors as circumstantial evidence of sub-
jective discriminatory intent survived, Mobile, but with modification.
The Zimmer criteria are to be applied "only to the extent that they
are relevant to the factual context at hand and, to the extent they
are not so relevant, to employ other criteria.""27 Furthermore,
reasoned the appellate court, the Supreme Court implicitly concluded
member of the legislative delegation testified to having no discriminatory motives
himself in proposing the legislation, but that one council member had indicated the
change was wanted to avoid a " 'salt and peper council.'" Id On the eve of the referen-
dum, the local newspaper ran an editorial specifically stating that the purpose of the
change was to avoid electing a Negro councilman. Id. at 1247-48.
269. Id. at 1241.
270. Id. at 1249. This answers one of the questions asked in Part V: What happens
if the motives for maintaining the system change from "bad" to "good"? This court's
answer is that the old motives continue to taint the situation so long as the intended
effects are still present.
27i. 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981). The panel in Lodge was composed of Circuit
Judges Fay, Jones, and Henderson. Henderson filed a dissent.
272. Id. at 1373.
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that absent proof of unresponsiveness, a prima facie case cannot be
established."' Unresponsiveness is crucial because effective political
participation, which is protected by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, means
that the system of government that serves the interest of the
people must serve the interests of all the people; at least to the
extent that one group's interests are not invidiously discrimin-
ated against. Therefore, a racially definable group may challenge
an electoral system on dilution grounds only if it can be shown
that the system invidiously operates to the detriment of their in-
terests."'
Unresponsiveness, while essential, is insufficient alone to establish
intent, or even to shift the burden of proof.27" Intent must still be
discerned from the totality of the circumstances.
The court then applied this modified Zimmer/unresponsiveness/
toality of the circumstances approach to affirm the district court's
finding of unconstitutional motivation. The evidence as recounted by
the Court of Appeals established that the plaintiffs, black residents
of a large, rural Georgia county, were not effectively participating in
the electoral process. In short, "dilution" as described in Part V was
established."' The conclusion that the dilution was the product of
273. Id. at 1373-74. There is no cite to Mobile to support this statement. For
reasons stated earlier, the author believes responsiveness is an essential element of
the case so long as the basis for the claim is infringement of the right to vote. Con-
ceptually it is difficult to explain why any specific intermediate finding should be
essential to the ultimate conclusidn that the legislature employed an impermissible
basis for its decision.
274. Id. at 1374. Clearly this court views the value at stake to be that of the right
to vote, and not antidiscrimination. Perhaps in its distance from the social and political
reality extant in Mobile, the Supreme Court simply was unwilling to believe a group
representing 35 percent of the electorate could be "fenced out" of the political process.
See, the comment of Justice Stevens:
I also disagree with Mr. Justice Marshall to the extent that he implies that the
vote cast in an at-large election by members of a racial minority can never be
anything more than 'meaningless ballots.' I have no doubt the analyses of
Presidential, senatorial, and other state wide elections would demonstrate that
ethnic and racial minorities have often had a critical impact on the choice of can-
didates and the outcome of elections. There is no reason to believe the same
political forces cannot operate in smaller election districts regardless of the depth
of conviction or emotion that may separate the partisans of different point of
view.
446 U.S. at 86, n.5 (Stevens, J.. concurring in judgment).
275. 639 F.2d at 1375. See the contra view of the author, Part V, supra.
276. Although a slight majority of the population, blacks were clearly a "cognizable
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unconstitutional motivation is only slightly more problematic. While
the evidence in Lodge did not differ in kind greatly, if at all, from
that found insufficient by the Mobile plurality, it was more extreme
and as such presented a more sympathetic case, regardless of the
theoretical basis for the claim. None of the evidence directly im-
plicated the statute mandating at-large elections, but the inference
is easily drawn: a government that discriminates against blacks at
every opportunity probably retained a method of election that im-
munizes its behavior from the impact of its victim's vote because it
does just that.27
Whether these two cases be reconciled depends upon the Lodge
court's reason for requiring unresponsiveness. If the court is saying
proof of unresponsiveness is necessary because without it there is
no discriminatory impact, then the cases are clearly at odds. The
McMillan court viewed the effect of the at-large systems on the
ability of blacks to elect a candidate of their own race as racially
discriminatory without any further showing of exclusion from the
political process. 7'
minority," not only on account of race, but because of their extremely depressed socio-
economic status, caused in part by past and present discrimination. As a group, blacks
were discriminated against by the majority in its political behaivor. Evidence of extreme
racial bloc voting, plus evidence that blacks had been excluded from participation in the
operation of the Democratic party, and even that blacks had recently experienced dif-
ficulty in registering to vote was shown at the trial. The anti-black attitude of the ma-
jority made person-to-person campaigning, necessary in a rural county, impossible for
blacks. Evidence of unresponsiveness was voluminous and touched all areas of govern-
mental responsibility. All of the high vote percentage determing devices were present:
majority vote, place system unrelated to residency, plus no viable second party.
277. The alternative source of intent suggested in Part V-finding it in the other
dilution factors rather than looking solely to the factor of method of election-is
unusually appropriate here. One of the other two cases decided by the same panel fail-
ed because unresponsiveness had not been demonstrated. Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d
1383 (5th Cir. 1981). The other, Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 639
F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1981), was reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Lodge. The district court had interpreted Mobile to mean that proof of the Zimmer
factors is not adequate to allow an interference of discriminatory maintenance. The
Court of Appeals urged the district court on remand to pay particular attention to
depressed socio-economic conditions, as well as all the Zimmer factors.
278. 638 F.2d at 1248.
The defendants argued . . . that there is no discriminatory effect in this case
because whites campaign for black votes and were ... responsive to the needs of
the black community. The defendants' argument misses the point. That the gover-
ning body may. be benevolent is not relevant. The effect necessary for a case to
be made is dilution' of the votes of the minority. This is generally proven by
evidence that a substantial minority is consistently unable to elect candidates of
its choice.
Id at n.18 (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, if the Lodge court is saying, as it appears to
be, that proof of responsiveness is crucial when one must rely upon
circumstantial evidence for proof of a continuing discriminatory
motive,"' then the two cases are less far apart. If this latter inter-
pretation is the correct one, the court's imperative on unresponsive-
ness should be read to say "except when there is a smoking gun."' ,,
When there is a smoking gun, the process analysis of Arlington
Heights is available. For changes adopted soon after the demise of
the white primary or other disfranchising devices, this may be ade-
quate."8 '
Without the smoking gun, however, the route to disciminatory
intent is necessarily more circuitous. If the inquiry is truly directed
toward finding that the legislature had a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, the Lodge court may have over-emphasized unresponsiveness.
If the gravamen of the complaint is that the method of election is
the product of a racially discriminatory motive, direct evidence of
that motive should establish a constitutional violation (assuming the
intended impact is discriminatory), even if on every other matter of
interest to the black community the legislators were totally respon-
sive. Regardless of the implications of its absence, however, unre-
sponsiveness in conjunction with the other "dilution factors" is
strong circumstantial evidence of racial motivation.
If the Supreme Court is to avoid overstepping its role in a
democratic society, Lodge, regardless of the motive of those respon-
sible for retaining the system, presents a more compelling case than
McMillan. Superficially, McMillan is not objectionable as an applica-
tion of the suspect classification doctrine. Legislators ought not to
select or maintain an election system because of its impact on the
election of blacks. Nevertheless the motive may be found objection-
279. The court's insistence upon reponsiveness came in answer to the question
"what type and how much evidence is required to establish proof of a discriminatory
purpose." 639 F.2d at 1373.
280. That the court was thinking ip these terms is suggested by the following
statement:
(Clommon sense tells us that in a case such as this, in which it cannot be asserted
that the system was created for discriminatory purposes, it is likely that no plain-
tiff could ever find direct evidence that the system was maintained for
discriminatory purposes. Clearly, the right to relief cannot depend on whether or
not public officials have created inculpatory documents.
281. The other significant triggering device for discriminatory changes is the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, but those changes should have been "caught" by the pre-
clearance requirements of section 5. The political subdivisions in McMillan were not
subject to its provisions, however.
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able because it strongly suggests that blacks will not be represented
by anyone (black or otherwise). But what if, as the city argued in
McMillan, the discriminatory reasons for the adoption of at-large
elections twenty-five years earlier have long been replaced by legiti-
mate good government ones? And furthermore, blacks are now as
fully "represented" as other citizens? Should we insist upon replac-
ing a system where blacks have some influence over all the officials,
with one where they will have great influence over a few? 82 Setting
aside legislation which accomplishes perfectly legitimate ends
because of the motives of some of its adopters (most of whom may
no longer be on the scene) is a far more serious intrusion upon the
"democratic process" than in correcting a system which is not func-
tioning in a democratic way."'3
B. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
As noted earlier,28 section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has been a
very effective weapon in combating the enactment of election laws
which interfere with protection minorities' participation in the
political process. However, section 5 is of limited assistance because
(1) it applies only in certain states and political subdivisions;28 (2) its
preclearance provisions are triggered only by "changes" in the elec-
tion process after its effective date,288 and thus it has no impact on
laws and practices adopted before that time; (3) as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, the provision will be helpful only if the election
scheme or device adopted is more repressive than the scheme or de-
vice it replaces, although the submission requirement itself probably
is an additional deterrent;a7 and (4) the provision will expire in 1982
unless extended by Congress.288
282. There is also a slight problem with the appropriate remedy. Are blacks now
entitled to a system that assures the election of a black candidate, or merely to one
that is not the product of improper motivation, regardless of its impact?
283. For an in-depth treatment of the perplexing problems produced by motiva-
tional analysis see Alexander, Introduction. Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 925 (1978).
284. See part I, supra.
285. See part I, supra.
286. The effective date for jurisdictions covered by the original Act is November 1,
1964. For those jurisdictions added by the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
the effective date is November 1, 1972. See the discussion in Part I, note 166, supra,
and accompanying text.
287. Certain election systems and devices are known to be disfavored by the At-
torney General. Rather than run the risk of incurring an objection to preclearance,
many jurisdictions no doubt simply avoid these devices entirely.
288. Actually, the Act does not expire. But after August 1982 covered jurisditions
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So long as the law is effective covered jurisdictions must obtain
federal preclearance of any change in practice or procedure affecting
voting in even a minor way.28" Thus all potentially dilutive devices
such as multi-member districts, at-large elections, majority vote re-
quirements, etc., adopted after the effective date the Act are sub-
ject to preclearance.
Section 5 provides two routes for preclearance. ° The one most
commonly chosen by covered jurisdictions is to submit the change to
the Attorney General who then mustobject within sixty days of his
receipt of a completed submission to prevent implementation of the
change.291 The alternative route, usually only selected after the
jurisdiction has been unable to secure preclearance from the At-
torney General, is to obtain a declaratory judgment from the
District of Columbia District Court that the change is not discrimin-
atory in purpose or effect. The burden of proof on the issue of dis-
criminatory purpose or effect is on the submitting authority. Thus if
either the Attorney General, or, alternatively, the District Court is
unable to conclude the burden has been met, preclearance must be
denied." ' Even when the election devices predate the effective date
of the Act, their presence may result in a denial of preclearance to
other changes. For example, an annexation to an existing municipal-
ity of a large number of new white voters may be denied preclear-
ance on the grounds that the percentage of black voters is thereby
diminished, thus lessening their impact in an at-large election
system."3 In order to obtain preclearance the submitting authority
may have to agree to adopt single member districts to compensate
for the "dilution."
The standard for judging whether a change is not discriminatory
in purpose or effect and thus is entitled to preclearance was set out
by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United States.2" If a change is not
retrogressive, it does not violate section 5 unless "the [newly
may remove themselves from coverage.
289. Allen v. State Bd. of Electors, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). See the discussion in Part I,
supra.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
291. The intricacies of the submission process are beyond the scope of this article.
The regulations governing the submission process are found at Procedures For the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51 (1980).
292. 28 C.F.R. 51.19 (1980). See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538
(1973).
293. See City of Richmond, Va. v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
294. See City of Petersburg, Va. v. United States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
295. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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adopted law] itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as
to violate the Constitution."2' The Court saw Congress' interest in
enacting section 5 as insuring that changes in voting procedures
would not lead to retrogression in the position of racial minorities in
their exercise of the electoral franchise. 2 Thus whether a newly
adopted law is discriminatory depends largely upon what it
replaces. 8
One consequence of the retrogression standard is that jurisdic-
tions which had more repressive election systems on the effective
date of the Act may be rewarded by easier preclearance because
any slight improvement will be sufficient to qualify as amelorative.
Strangely, this result may be entirely consistent with congressional
interest to "freeze" election laws in covered jurisdictions as of the
effective date of the Act in order to prevent further retrogressive
tactics. Furthermore the effect of a section 5 objection is to prevent
the implementation of the new law. The provision provides no fur-
ther remedy; therefore if an ameliorative change were to be denied
preclearance, the more repressive system would be resurrected. 9
296. Id. at 141.
297. 1d.
298. The plan in Beer was submitted by the City of New Orleans, which at the
time had a forty-five percent black population. The submitted councilmanic districting
plan was drawn so that the election of a black to one of the seven council seats was
probable. Because under the plan it replaced election of a black was unlikely, the Court
found the new plan to be ameliorative rather than retrogressive: it enhanced blacks'
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice vis-a-vis the plan it replaced. Id. at 142.
The Court also noted that the new plan did not even approach a violation of previously
enunciated constitutional standards set out in Fortson through White. Id. at 141 n.14.
This case should have been an early clue that there were considerable differences in
opinion among the members of the Court as to what these constitutional standards are.
The lower court relied heavily upon the presence of White-Zimmer facts as evidence
that blacks would be precluded from political participation by the new plan. Beer v.
United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 387-94 (D.D.C. 1974). Justice Marshall, dissenting, ex-
pressed the view that these factors would support a finding of unconstitutionality,
even without section 5.
299. The limited relief available under section 5 also produces interesting results
when a change in "retrogressive," but the system it replaces is unconstitutional. Such
a case was considered by the district court in Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F
Supp. 117 (D.D.C. 1978), affl'd, 439 U.S. 999 (1979). There the County sought preclear-
ance of changes from single member districts to at-large election systems. The court
found that the county had not carried its burden of proof and denied preclearance. The
effect of the denial of preclearance was to continue in existence the old single member
districts which were significantly malapportioned.
Although no further relief is available under section 5, black residents of the malap-
portioned district can bring a constitutional suit in their local district court. Any plan
proposed by the county in this suit to remedy malapportionment must first be submit-
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The Court in Beer indicated that even an ameliorative change
should be denied preclearance if the plan is unconstitutional. After
Mobile, a districting plan is unconstitutional on racial grounds only
if adopted for a discriminatory purpose. But election laws adopted
for such purposes are by the express language of section 5 not en-
titled to preclearance. Thus the Beer Court reference to the Con-
stitution as part of the preclearance standard is puzzling unless, of
course, the Court did not yet have Mobile in mind. At any rate, sec-
tion 5 places the burden of proof of the issue of discriminatory purpose
on the submitting authority, which means in close cases preclearance
should be denied.300
Because section 5 applies only to election law changes, the retro-
gression standard is consistent with the Congressional purpose for its
enactment-to prevent the adoption of new obstacles to effective poli-
tical participation by the minorities who would soon be enfranchised
by other provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court in its most recent section 5 decision, City of Rome v.
United States3"' adopted a short-sighted definition of retrogression.
The new definition appears to see Congress' goal of full minority par-
ticipation exclusively in terms of the minority group's ability to elect a
minority candidate, and thus views "any" theoretical dimunition in
this ability as retrogressive.
In 1979, the City of Rome, Georgia, sought district court pre-
clearance of a number of election changes enacted by the Georgia
legislature in 1966, but inadvertently not submitted until 1975.302
ted for section 5 preclearance before the Court can order it implemented. See
McDaniel v. Sanchez, 101 S. Ct. 2224 (1981).
300. In proving lack of a discriminatory purpose it should not be sufficient merely
to show that the change was undertaken for a legitimate purpose-for example, that a
reapportionment was undertaken to comply with a state constitutional requirement to
reapportion after every census, or to comply with one man/one vote requirements. The
state should also show that the actual plan adopted (as opposed to any conceivable plan
it could have adopted) was adopted for a legitimate purpose. In the reapportionment
hypothetical, the proof might include evidence of the basis for the plan, its underlying
goals, the extent to which it complies with one-man-one-vote requirements, and the
compactness of the districts. Because of their suspect nature the inclusion of multi-
member districts should require additional justification. (Of course, if the new plan in-
cludes multi-member districts where the old one did not, this could be an additional
'change," which could itself be retrogressive.)
301. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
302. Id. at 161. The plaintiff, City of Rome, also presented a number of procedural
challenges. The Court rejected the city's argument that as a separate political unit ioh
a covered state it should be allowed to "bail out" under section 4 of the Act in-
dependently of the State of Georgia (section 4 provides that covered jurisdictions may
remove themselves from the preclearance requirements of section 5 by obtaining a
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Rome had a 1970 population of 30,759, 76.6 percent white, and 23.4
percent black. The black percentage of the voting age population
was 20.6 percent.30 Prior to the 1966 changes, the City's charter pro-
vided for a nine-member city commission to be elected at-large by a
plurality of the vote, with one member residing in each of the city's
nine wards. A five member board of education was also elected by a
plurality at-large, without a residency requirement. In 1966, the
number of residency wards for the city commission was reduced to
three, with three commissioners to be elected at-large from each
ward by designated posts. The terms were to be staggered, and a
majority was required for election. The school board was expanded
to six members, with two members to be elected at-large from each
ward by designated posts."0 ' In essence, then, the change in the city
commission was from an at-large system with posts (a residency re-
quirement is the equivalent of a post) and only a plurality needed
for election to an at-large system with different posts and a majority
vote requirement. In the case of the school board the change was
from an at-large system without a post requirement and only a plur-
ality required for election, to an at-large system with posts and a
majority vote requirement.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion
that when those changes were combined with racial bloc voting, the
effect was dilution of the black voting strength. The Court reasoned
that under the previous plan, blacks could take advantage of vote
splitting by the whites, and perhaps elect a candidate of their choice
by "single shot voting" in his favor."' This would not be possible
under the submitted plan. Thus, concluded the Court, the change
"'would lead to retrogression in the position of racial minorities
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral process.' ,,'
The Rome majority is as remiss as the Mobile plurality in not
declaratory judgment from the District of Columbia District Court that no test or
device has been used in the jurisdiction during the preceding seventeen years for the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. 1973b(a) (1976)), id at 167. It also rejected Rome's argument that the Act ex-
ceeds Congress' power to enforce the fifteenth amendment by prohibiting
discriminatory effects. The Court concluded that under section 2 of the fifteenth
amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate
section 1 of the amendment so long as.the prohibitions are an appropriate method of
promoting the amendment's purposes. Id. at 173-78.
303. 446 U.S. at 159.
304. Id. at 160.
305. Id. at 183-84.
306. Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
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considering the underlying value of the right to vote-the only right
protected by section 5-when determining whether that right has
been denied or abridged. If the Mobile plurality's view of the right
as encompassing little more than the right to register and cast a
ballot freely is unnecessarily narrow, then the Rome majority,
speaking through Justice Marshall, has made an unwarranted and
arguably unwise leap in the opposite direction by equating "retro-
gression in the theoretical ability of the minority group to elect a
candidate of its choice," with "retrogression in their effective exer-
cise of the electoral process." '
Even if retrogression in the group's ability to elect a candidate
of its choice should be equated with retrogression in the group's po-
litical strength, the district court's finding of "retrogression" was
based on highly unlikely conjecture. The Court's suggestion that
under the old system minorities could take advantage of vote split-
ting and single-shot voting to select a candidate does not appear to
be accurate. The old system required one commissioner to be
elected from each of the nine residency wards, thus single shooting
could not be utilized effectively. 8 Since the Board of Education was
elected at-large, without a residency requirement, single shot voting
would have been possible, but only theoretically helpful.
True, the added majority vote requirement makes election of a
black candidate more difficult in both the commission and the board
elections. However, even without this requirement, a black can-
didate could not be elected to the commission without white support
unless whites split their vote fairly evenly among a relatively large
307. In fairness to the majority opinion, it should be noted that some support for
this equation is found in the legislative history of the 1975 extension of the Voting
Rights Act. "[Tlhe standard [under section 5] can only be fully satisfied by determin-
ing on the basis of the facts found ...to be true whether the ability of minority
groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is
augmented, diminished or not affected by the change affecting voting ...." H.R. REP.
No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1975) (emphasis added), cited in 425 U.S. at 140
(with different emphasis). Justice Marshall's opinion did not cite this passage to sup-
port its equation.
308. The majority opinion devoted very little space to the substative preclearance
issue, and thus there may have been unmentioned factors that led the majority to con-
clude that the old system would allow single shooting. One explanation comes from the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun. The Attorney General apparently did not
object to the reduction of the nine wards to three. Thus if a partial preclearance were
allowed-i.e.. the reduction was acceptable but the posts, which were accompanied by
staggered terms, within the three wards were not, then single shooting would be
possible-blacks could vote for one instead of three, candidates per ward. 446 U.S. at
189.
1982]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
number of other candidates for a particular post.3" With the fewer
votes needed for a plurality, and with careful use of single shooting,
blacks' chances for electing a black to the board were better, but
still slim without substantial white support."'
While the evidence of retrogression-even in the ability to elect
a candidate of their choice-was mostly theoretical, evidence that
Rome's black citizens were effective participants in the political life
of the city was quite concrete. Justice Rehnquist dissenting, pointed
out:
The lower court found .. . [no] barriers to black voter registra-
tion . . . to black voting or black candidancy . . . that white
elected officials have encouraged blacks to run for elective posts
• ..and are "responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community." The city has not discriminated against blacks in the
provision of services and has made efforts to upgrade black
neighborhoods.
It was also established that although a black has never been
elected to political office in Rome, a black was appointed to fill a
vacancy in an elective post. White candidates vigorously pursue
the support of black voters. Several commissioners testified that
they spent proportionately more time campaigning in the black
community because they "needed that vote to win." The Court
concluded that "blacks often hold the balance of power in Rome
elections." ''
Thus it appears that a constitutional challenge to Rome's election
system would not have been successful under the "old" dilution stan-
dard of White and Zimmer, and clearly, given the absence of
evidence of intentional discrimination in the record, would not pass
muster after Mobile.
For better or worse, it seems clear that the Court has found in
309. The government relied upon a single election contest to establish the impact
of the majority vote requirement. A'black candidate for the school board led a field of
four candidates in the first election with 39 percent of the vote, but lost the run-off
with 45 percent of the vote. 446 U.S. at 184 n.20. It is of course indisputable that "but
for" the majority vote requirement, the black candidate would have been elected.
However, it is also indisputable that over half of the votes he received must have come
from white voters, because less than twenty percent of the voters were black. 446 U.S.
at 195.
310. If blacks are able to garner white support and to form alliances with other
groups, then there is no justification for finding that black candidates are disadvantaged
by the election structure any more than are other candidates.
311. 446 U.S. at 208 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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section 5's "effect of denying the right to vote on account of race"
language a strange entitlement for minority voters-the right to be
free from election changes which even theoretically reduce their
chances of electing a candidate of their choice, regardless of how
successfully they are participating in the political life of the covered
jurisdiction. Even if Congress has the authority to ordain such a
result in the name of affirmatively providing greater protection for
a previously excluded minority, one may question its desirability. In
light of the specific finding by the trial, court that blacks played a
key role in Rome's politics and that they played it well enough to
secure for themselves the full benefits of the "right to vote," forcing
the city to abandon a fully functioning election system represents
unwarranted judicial tampering. Although in the case of Rome,
blacks were elected to both bodies under the "revived" plan (notably
with considerable white supportP' whether the black community
will receive greater "value" from their vote remains to be seen. The
Court may have negotiated a "trade" of political clout for a token
representative.
This criticism of the result in Rome does not mean that changes
such as those involved should never be denied preclearance. Had the
record denonstrated that Rome's black citizens were not effective
participants-that racial bloc voting was prevalent, that white
voters were unwilling to form political alliances with blacks, that
they were unable to make their numbers count in the decision-
making process of city government-then any further weakening of
their position by potentially discriminatory election laws should not
be allowed under section 5. If the only opportunity for any political
voice is through the remote possibility of electing a candidate, then
this possibility should be preserved. 3 ' This simply was not the case
in Rome. The increased difficulty of electing a black candidate
should have been sufficient to imply retrogression in the group's
ability to participate effectively in the political process. This implica-
tion, however, was more than adequately rebutted by the district
court's finding of full black political participation.
Other supporters of minority voting rights are likely to view the
Rome result more favorably than the writer. Rome practically
312. See MATHIS & MATHIS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND ROME (GEORGIA) CITY
ELECTIONS 11-12 (1981).
313. Note also that Rome was an unusual section 5 action because the change had
been implemented for nine years and thus evidence of its actual impact was available.
Typically, this evidence will not be available, and proof that the change will not have a
discriminatory impact will be difficult, if not impossible, for the submitting authority.
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eliminates any possibility. that any of the devices traditionally
associated with dilution can successfully be adopted by covered jur-
isdictions, regardless of whether they acutally result in dilution as
defined in Part V. Undoubtably, in most situations where a change
makes the election of black candidates theoretically more difficult, it
also renders black political power less effective. Any harm to
minorities is more likely to come from increased resentment on the
part of covered jurisdictions engendered by the questionabre logic of
the decision and the increased clout it provides the Attorney
General in the section 5 submission process. 1 ' Furthermore, the
decision supplies ammunition for those who argue that section 5 is
being used to guarantee blacks and other minorities proportional
representation, and therefore should be allowed to expire.
Rome is also important because, together with Mobile, it in-
dicates serious divisiveness among members of the Court on the
meaning of the right to vote, with none of the "camps" consistently
heeding the underlying value of voting. Presumably, those members
who voted with both the Mobile plurality and the Rome majority did
so on the basis the different statutory standard,31 but the cases can-
not rationally be reconciled on that basis. Even under section 5's "ef-
fects" standard it is still the right to vote which must be affected.
C. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
In addition to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment claims,
the complaint in Mobile alleged that the city's at-large election
system violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which unlike sec-
314. Although the same standard for preclearance supposedly is applied by the At-
torney General in passing upon submissions, in actuality this may not be true. Since
the Attorney General's decision under section 5 is not subject to judicial review, Morris
v. Gressette. 432 U.S. 491 (1977), there is no "check" on the standard he applies. Since
the only recourse for a submitting authority whose submission to the Attorney
General has been denied preclearance is to obtain a very expensive de novo action in
the District of Columbia Court, the Attorney General has a great deal of clout. In its
submission, the submitting authority may make a prima facie showing of non-
retrogression and lack of discriminatory intent but beyond that has no control over the
additional evidence considered by the Attorney General, who is not limited to evidence
that would be admissible in court. In fact the submitting authority is not informed as
to the infomation upon which the Attorney General bases his decision, and, therefore,
cannot rebut it or evaluate his weighing of the evidence.
315. The Chief Justice was part of the plurality and the majority and thus express-
ed no separate opinions. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred with both, and did not explain
his seemingly inconsistent votes. He did, however, place racial vote dilution cases in a
separate category from cases denying individuals' access to the ballot and cases alleg-
ing malapportionment. 446 U.S. at 83-84.
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tion 5, is national in application and is not limited to "changes." The
trial court and the parties apparently treated the Mobile case as a
"dilution" case without separately considering the statutory and
constitutional bases for the claim. Neither the district court nor the
Court of Appeals opinion based their decision on statutory claims. In
just three paragraphs, the plurality disposed of this claim by con-
cluding that section 2 was merely a restatement of the fifteenth
amendment, and thus added nothing to the plaintiff's argument. Only
Justice Marshall's dissent31 addressed the issue.
Nor did section 2 receive extensive treatment in the briefs filed
by the Mobile parties. The appellees (plaintiffs below) maintained
that the substantive standard for section 5 should also apply to sec-
tion 2. Otherwise, it is necessary to assume Congress intended to
prohibit new election laws under section 5, even if those same laws
would be immune from attack if they predated section 5, or were in
jurisdictions not subject to its provisions. Thus, reasoned the ap-
pellees, a more logical interpretation is that section 2 and section 5
both prohibit election laws which have the purpose or effect of deny-
ing the right to vote on account of race. Only the method of enforc-
ing the prohibition is different, with the political subdivision having
the burden of proof under section 5, and those attacking the law
having the burden under section 2.817
Section 2 received little attention prior to Mobile, probably
because it was generally believed that "dilution" claims were main-
tainable under the fourteenth amendment, regardless of the motives
of those responsible for the dilution." 8 With only Justice Brennan
and Marshall expressing the view that "discriminating effects" alone
can constitute a constitutional violation, section 2 may be receiving
heightened attention. Since a majority of the Court has not specifi-
cally stated a position-indeed there may be some question as to
whether the issue was actually before the Court in Mobile 19-efforts
to present the issue again more persuasively would seem worth-
while.
316. Justice Marshall. dissenting, argeed that section 2 is coextensive with the fif-
teenth amendment, but disagreed with the plurality as to the appropriate scope of the
amendment. He no doubt would concede that regardless of the constitutional require-
ment, section 2 could be interpreted differently. Id. at 103.
317. Brief of the Appellees at 11-17, Bolden v. Mobile. The Appellants maintained
the issue was not before the Court. Reply Brief for Appellants at 2.
318. See generally Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1134 (1976). Note, Racial
Vote Dilution in Multi-member Districts: The Constitutional Standard After
Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1978);
319. The fifteenth amendment and section 2 claims were rejected by the Court of
3.982)
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The statutory argument is particularly appealing because of the
demonstrated willingness of members of the plurality to find that
Congress had the power to pass legislation going beyond the ex-
pressed prohibitions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. In
the Rome case, a majority of the court agreed that the enforcement
provision of the fifteenth amendment allows Congress to prohibit
practices that in and of themselves do not violate section 1 of the
amendment, and thus upheld the "effects" standard of section 5, re-
gardless of whether the amendment itself prohibits only "inten-
tional" discrimination." Likewise, a majority of the court has been
willing to find similar congressional authority under the fourteenth
amendment. 2'
Congress may constitutionally enact prohibitions that exceed the
fifteenth amendment in an effort to secure its guarantees, but has it
in fact attempted to do so in section 2? If section 2 is to be an
available alternative to the Constitution for dilution claims, three
questions must be answered: 1) Did Congress intend for section 2 to
prohibit voting practices that have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote; 2) Did Congress believe the right to vote could
be violated by procedures that do not affect access to the ballot; and
3) Did Congress see election structures that contribute to "dilution"
as devices that have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote?
Appeals and were not cross-appealed. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 2.
320. 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980). See the discussion of Rome, in part VI B, supra. Only
Justice Powell, Rehnquist and Stewart dissented from the Rome decision. Powell's dis-
sent was based upon his belief that the city should have been allowed to "bail out"
under section 4. Rehnquist, while agreeing that Congress can do more than just en-
force the amendment's command, believed that the majority went too far. Congress'
power, he reasoned, should be limited to remedial situations-to remedy past constitu-
tional wrongs or to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination by a governmental
unit. The majority's decision was not so limited. No finding was made that the
legitimate inference of a discriminatory purpose allowed by virtue of the change itself
was effectively rebutted. 446 U.S. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
321. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act, which prohibited application of a state English literacy requirement
as a prerequisite to voting for persons who had attended certain non-English schools).
See also Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) ("discriminatory effects" were sufficient to
violate the Fair Housing Act); Grigg v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employ-




1. Did Congress intend for Section 2 to prohibit voting
practices that have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote?
A logical starting place for discerning Congress's purpose for
section 2 is the language of the section and its function in the over-
all congressional scheme to be implemented by the Voting Rights
Act.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act is an incredibly complicated statute.
Many of its nineteen sections are intertwined and careful dissection
is needed in order for it to be comprehensible. One sentence in sec-
tion 5, for example, is forty-two lines long and makes six references
to other sections of the Act. By contrast, section 2 contains a simple
imperative:
No voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right ... to vote
on account of race or color. .... 11
In its simplicity the language of section 2 is ambiguous. The pro-
vision says nothing about "intent," "purpose," or "effect," and much
could be made of the omission. However, when the section is read as
the introduction, the preamble, to a comprehensive scheme designed
to insure the right to vote and to remedy past discrimination, the
omission of this language is understandable.
Section 2 is the first substantive section of the Act. It is the all-
encompassing statement of what is prohibited by the entire Act. All
that follows represents Congress' method of carrying out section 2's
imperative. This is highlighted by the fact that section 2 is 42 U.S.C.
1973 with no subparagraph description. The remaining sections of
the Act are subparagraphs of section 2. The subparagraphs repre-
sent particular ways that discrimination in voting is to be barred.
Other imperatives appear throughout the remainder of the Act, but
none as broad as section 2, and like section 2, none of these "impera-
tive" statements contain the "purpose or effect" language.
For example section 4 states in part: "[N]o citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any ... election because of his failure to
comply with any test or device . .. .
322. 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1965). The Act was amended in 1975 to extend this prohibition
to read "or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)," which
prohibits discrimination against language minority groups.
323. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976). In addition, section 1973b(e)(2) provides in part:
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Other sections of the Act provides means for guaranteeing the
non-abridgement of the rights protected, and delineate the remedy
to be employed upon certain findings of fact. In these sections - those
dealing with findings to be made rather than with prohibitions - the
"purpose or effect" language appears. For example, section 3(b) pro.
vides, in part:
If in a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or any ag-
grieved person under any statute to enforce the voting guaran-
tees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment . . . the court
finds that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with
the effect of denying or abridging the right ...to vote on ac-
count of race or color, ... it shall suspend the use of tests and
devices .... 32'
Section 3(c) provides that courts may as a part of the relief in a
voting case suspend voting law changes in the offending political
subdivision until the court determines that the change . . . "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote ....
Section 4,326 which contains the trigger provisions for coverage,
makes six references to "purpose or effect" and always in the con-
text of a "finding" or "determination" to be made. Likewise, the all
important section 5, discussed in detail elsewhere, requires the
District of Columbia District Court to determine that election
changes in jurisdictions subject to its provisions "[do] not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote .
"No person ...shall be denied the right to vote ...because of his inability to read,
write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language ...."
Section 1973b(f)(2), which was added to the Act in 1975, extends protection to certain
language minorities and provides in part: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote because he is a member of a language minority group." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2)
(1976).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (1976) (emphasis added). Originally, the Senate bill refer-
red to "discriminatory purpose," 111 CONG. REC. 28360 (1965) while the House version
included "effect." The House version was adopted. 111 CONG. REC. 28370 (1965).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1965). Originally, section 4 referred to "denials of the right
to vote." S.1564, 111 CONG. REC. 28358 (1965). This was changed to "for the purpose of
denying," S.1564, 111 CONG. REC. 28360 (1965), and was finally modified to include
"discriminatory effects," 111 CONG. REC. 28365 (1965).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1975) (emphasis added). The original language of section 5
was "discriminatory effect," S.1564, 111 CONG. REC. 28358 (1965), but it was broadened
to include "purpose" by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 111 CONG. REC. 28360 (1965).
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Finally in section 101" Congress set out findings which imply
that it believed that the constitutional rights sought to be protected
by the Act could be violated without regard to the purpose of the
violators. In that section Congress authorized the Attorney General
to bring suit against the enforcement of any requirement of pay-
ment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting because of its findings
that, inter alia . . . "in some areas [the poll tax] has the purpose or
effect of denying persons the right to vote because of race or color.
Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that the con-
stitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged ... -
Viewing the Act as a whole, clearly Congress intended to outlaw
racial discrimination in voting regardless of the vehicle for the dis-
crimination, and, in the words of President Johnson, to "establish a
simple, uniform standard which cannot be used however ingenious
the effort, to flout our Constitution." ' Where Congress was certain
as to the evil, it was specifically outlawed. But being well aware
that discrimination can be subtle as well as obvious, Congress in sec-
tion 2 outlawed any and every thing that could be demonstrated to
deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, leaving open
for future determination what those things might be. Since Con-
gress by outlawing known evils-literacy tests, poll taxes, and un-
precleared election changes in covered states-expressed the view
that these devices could have the purpose or effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote, an assumption that Congress believed
any other "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or stan-
dard, practice or procedure" could only deny or abridge the right to
vote if enacted or maintained for the purpose of discriminating
would be illogical. In short, no basis exists for assuming Congress in-
tended one standard for outlawing known evils, but another for evils
not readily apparent.
Had the "purpose or effect" language appeared only in connec-
tion with the preclearance provisions, which apply only in areas
with a legislatively determined history of fifteenth amendment vio-
lations, a different interpretation might be placed upon the absence
of this language in section 2. Congress could have anticipated that
after literacy tests-the chief vehicle for disfranchisement in the
covered jurisdictions-were abolished, new devices would be
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (1965).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a) (1965) (emphasis added).
330. Address on Voting Rights to Joint Session of Congress by President Johnson,
March 15, 1965, 111 CONG. REC. 5058 (1965).
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adopted to take their place." Recognizing the difficulty of proving
"purpose," and in light of those regions' past history of racial voting
discrimination, Congress could have concluded that these newly
enacted devices justified a conclusive presumption of discriminatory
purpose when a discriminatory effect was proved. Alternatively,
Congress could have concluded that in regions with a history of
discrimination, a neutrally motivated voting change could
perpetuate the effect of prior intentional discrimination, and that to
outlaw this perpetuation constitutes legitimate remedial legislation.3""
These arguments are negated for two reasons. First, "purpose
or effect" language is also found in the provisions applicable nation-
wide, including jurisdictions for which no prior history of discrimina-
tion existed' Second, whatever justification exists for treating
Rome, Georgia, differently from Indianapolis, Indiana, on the basis
of the former's discriminatory past will not support a similar distinc-
tion between Rome and Mobile. If a change to an election system
that has a discriminatory impact gives rise to a presumption of a
discriminatory purpose under section 5 in Rome, understanding why
the maintenance of a similar system in Mobile would not give rise to
a similar presumption is difficult. Furthermore, the maintenance of a
system with a discriminatory impact perpetuates the effects of past
intentional discrimination as effectively as would the adoption of
that same system..
Since section 2 was not a controversial provision in 1965,
records of debates over its substantive standards are scarce, if not
non-existent. During the Senate hearings on the original bill, there
was some discussion of the meaning of the word "procedure" in sec-
tion 2. Attorney General Katzenbach, as spokesman for, and chief
draftsman of, the Administration's bill, explained: "I had thought of
the word 'procedure' as including any kind of practice if its purpose
or effect was to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of
race."3 ' Several other references to the section's substantive stan-
dard are found in dicta in the legislative history of the 1970 and
331. Senator Mansfield (D. Mont.), a sponsor of the bill, recognized this problem.
"The preclearance requirement is merely a common sense method of insuring that
literacy tests and similar devices are not replaced by other vehicles of discrimination
as soon as the ban on literacy tests takes effect." The debates are reported in IIB.
SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS (1970).
332. The legislative history supports this view. See the remarks of Senator Javitts
in the text accompanying note 359, infra, and the discussion therein.
333. Hearings on S.1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 191 (1965). Although the thrust of his remark was directed toward the mean-
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1975 extension hearings. In 1970, the Administration proposed a bill
that would have eliminated section 5 and as a "fair trade," according
to the Administration spokesman, Attorney General Mitchell, would
-have strengthened section 2. Mitchell testified:
Under the present law outside of the seven covered states, the
Attorney General is limited in voting rights cases to a claim of
constitutional violation. Under our proposal, he could institute a
lawsuit any place in the country based on a broader statutory
protection of a discriminatory "purpose or effect" of a particular
voting law or set of voting laws."'
The Administration's bill was passed by the House, 35 but was
never enacted. The bill that became law, the 1970 Voting Rights
Amendment,33 0 extended the operative provisions of section 5 for an
additional five years. Section 5 was recognized as the heart of the
Voting Rights Act, and any suggestion that it could be "replaced"
by a provision allowing the Attorney General to bring "purpose or
effect" suits could not have been taken seriously. However, during
the discussion of the Administration's bill, proponents of extension
noted several times that the Attorney General already possessed
the authority to bring these suits, and thus the proposal presented
no "tradeoff."37 Typical of the comments is the following statement,
adopted from the Civil Rights Commission, by the sponsors of the
substitute bill ultimately enacted:
S. 2507, after eliminating the simple enforcement procedure (of
section 5) would substitute a section authorizing the Attorney
ing of "procedure," examination of Katzenbach's testimony throughout the hearings
demonstrates that he believed the fifteenth amendment to prohibit practices that were
discriminatory in either purpose or effect. See Brief of the United States. Lodge v.
Buxton, at 41. The Justice Department also notes in this brief that this discussion is
the "only direct description of the substantive standard of proof under Section 2 that
our research has disclosed in the 1965 legislative hearings and debates on the Act."
Brief of the United States at 40.
334. Statement of Attorney General Mitchell, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 1st & 2d Sess.
189-90 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1970)].
335. 115 CONo. REC. 38535 (1969).
336. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314.
337. See comments from the Senate Hearings (1970), supra note 340: Senator
Mathias: "The power being given to the Attorney General ... doesn't add anything of
great substance which isn't already in the Act." Id at 22. Senator Bayh: "I do not
think you are getting any additional power that you do not now have under the 1957
and 1965 Acts and under Section 2, 3, and 12 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. I think
you have these very powers .. " Id. at 203.
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General to sue the Federal Court whenever he believes a State
has enacted or is administering any voting procedure with the
purpose or effect of denying the francise on grounds of race. But
the Attorney General already has the authority to bring such
suits (under Sections 2 and 121d) . . . . Thus, the new section
would give the Attorney General no new powers in addition to
those granted by the Voting Rights Act and its predecessors.338
Likewise, during the 1975 extension debate, an opponent of sim-
ple extension, Senator Scott of Virginia, proposed a change in the
coverage provision which would have effectively repealed section 5
for all the jurisdictions covered in 1965. In support of his bill,
Senator Scott noted: "Substantially all the rights that are in the
temporary legislation are in the permanent legislation . . . . The
principal difference relates to the burden of proof ....... Senator
Scott further described these permanent provisions: "There is a
general law . . . that does not require extension, that protects the
rights of all citizens to vote, and that is title 1, sections 2 and 3 . .. ."'
2. Did Congress believe the right to vote could be violated by
procedures, devices, etc. that do not affect access to the
ballot?
If section 2 is to be a viable option to a constitutional suit, it is
also necessary to address Justice Stewart's assertion that the fif-
teenth amendment, and thus section 2, applys only to denial of ac-
cess to the ballot."' As originally drafted, section 2 included a pro-
hibition against any "qualifications or procedure." During Senate
hearings on the bill, concern was expressed that the word "pro-
cedure" might not reach all the potentially discriminatory practices.
To give the Act the broadest possible scope, the language was ex-
panded to include "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure." ' The Supreme Court in Allen v.
State Board of Education,3 ' utilized this change in the language of
338. Joint Views of Ten Members of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Exten-
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 116 CONG. REC. 5523, 5527 (1970) (emphasis add-
ed). Seven of those ten senators were sponsors of S.1564 which was enacted as the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
339. 121 CONG. REC. 24705 (1975).
340. 121 CONG. REc. 24708 (1975).
341. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
342. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). For a discussion on the meaning of "procedure" see
Hearings on S.1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Crong., 1st Sess.
191-92 (1965).
343. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). As the earlier discussion of Allen indicates, this decision
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section 21" to support its interpretation that the identical langauge
in section 5 was broad enough to include a change from district to
at-large elections: "The Voting Rights Act was aimed to subtle, as
well as obvious state regulations which have the effect of denying
citizens their rights to vote because of their race."""5 The Court con-
tinued: "[TJhe Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote,
recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote
effective.' . . . See Reynolds v. Sims .... ,
Thus the Court, in its first opportunity to rule on the breadth of
the Act, adopted the position that the legislative history supports
the notion that Congress believed districting-an act which in no
way affects registration or balloting-could deny the right to vote.
Unless the Court is prepared to believe that the "right to vote" in
section 2 is different from the "right to vote" in section 5, the
Mobile plurality's view of section 2 must be seen as inconsistent
with Allen.
3. Did Congress see election structures that contribute to
"dilution" as devices that have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote?
The legislative history is consistent with the view that
"dilution" is a denial of the right to vote within the meaning of the
Act. Clearly the sponsors of the 1965 Act were concerned primarily
with removing barriers to registration and balloting."' In an era
when mass disfranchisement of blacks was the norm in southern
states, the possibility of the election structure diluting black voting
strength probably did not receive much attention. By the time the
with its liberal interpretation of the "changes" subject to preclearance gave section 5
the needed clout to prevent the political "retrogression" of newly enfranchised
minorites. See the discussion in Part I, 8upra.
344. This clarification of the language of section 2 was also discussed in an analysis
of the bill submitted by some of its Senate sponsors: "This Section is the same as in-
troduced except that changes have been made to make clear that the rights protected
are those of citizens of the United States and to set out with more specificity the
breadth of those rights." Joint Views of Twelve Members of the Judiciary Committee,
[1965], U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2557.
345. 393 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 565-66.
347. Although the major thrust of the Act was to ban the chief agent of disfran-
chisement, the literacy test, and to avoid the necessity for piecemeal litigation against
any new scheme designed to take its place, the Act also contains provisions designed
to guard against discriminatory tactics at the polling place, and in the counting of




temporary provisions were on the verge of expiring in 1975,
however, "dilution" was much more a concern. The Senate Hearings
are replete with testimony about the discriminatory effects of multi-
member and at-large districts.8 Numerous section 5 objections to
the adoption of these practices were noted."9 The Assistant At-
torney General for Civil Rights, J. Stanley Pottinger, was question-
ed about the Justice Department's litigative efforts to have these
devices enjoined."' At no point was the suggestion made that the
Act needed to be strengthened to allow this type of litigation. In
light of other suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the
Act,8"' a reasonable presumption may be made that the Act's sup-
porters believed dilution was already prohibited by the permanent
provision of the Act.
Concluding that section 2 prohibits election structures that con-
tribute to dilution, regardless of the purpose of their enactment,
solves the problem of Mobile, but not the problem of how to define
dilution. By the 1975 extension hearings Congress should have been
aware of White, Zimmer, and numerous other dilution cases, and
reasonably could have considered them to be definitive of the issue.
The inadequacy of the definition derived from those cases was
discussed in Part II, and the substitute proposed there is equally ap-
propriate for claims brought under section 2.
Alternatively, section 2 may be seen as prohibiting election
laws, which, although neutral themselves, have the effect of continu-
ing the harm caused by past intentional violations of the fifteenth
amendment. This view is similar to the intent standard for constitu-
tional voting cases suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors.52 Kirksey reasons that minorities have not
been fully compensated for past blatant denials of the franchise until
348. Hearings on Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 124,
125, 149, 159, 225, 464-65, 500-01, 553, 561 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing
(1975)).
349. Senate Hearing (1975), supra, note 354, at 598-600.
350. Senate Hearing (1975), supra, note 354, at 561.
351. Senate Hearing (1975), supra, note 354. The Act was extended and expanded
by the 1975 amendments. Witnesses before the Committee were often asked if por-
tions needed strengthening. For example, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights was asked if, in light of the Beer v. United States case then pending, an amend-
ment to the Act was needed to make clear that redistricting was within the scope of
section 5. Id at 567.




they are full participants in the political process. Any state-imposed
device which perpetuates the effects of past disfranchisement is in
essence a substitute for the previous intentional denial. Regardless
of whether the neutral maintenance of such devices states a claim
under the Constitution as suggested by Kirksey, it is entirely consis-
tent with the remedial nature of the Voting Rights Act to recognize
such a claim under section 2.
The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act amply supports
the notion that Congress intended not only to bar future discrimina-
tion, but to remedy the effects of past discrimination. As noted by
Senator Javitts:
"[T]here is one fundamental concept about this bill .... This bill
was designed not only to correct an active history of discrimina-
tion, the denying of Negroes of the right to register and vote,
but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination .... But
to assume that this bill has only one dimension and to say, 'I am
not discriminating now' is neither the background nor purpose
of the bill."" .
The purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to enforce the guaran-
tees of the fifteenth amendment. The fifteenth amendment is not
truly being enforced. until all effects of its past abridgment which
can be eradicated have been."
The difference between this standard and pure effects standard
is obviously the necessity of proving past disfranchisement. Thus, in
jurisdictions where there has been no history of disfranchisement,
no claim for relief could be stated even though minorities were cur-
rently being effectively precluded from meaningful political partici-
pation. As a practical matter, however, the kind of exclusion from
the political process suggested in Part V as the appropriate factual
basis for dilution is unlikely to be found in jurisdictions that have
never experienced fifteenth amendment violations.
353. 111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965).
354. The "continuing effects" should be determined in a manner consistent with the
values and interests being furthered by the right to vote. Some will. argue that the
effects of past denials have not been fully eradicated until proportional representation
has been achieved. The rationale for rejecting that argument in proposing a constitu-
tional standard (see Part V, 8upra) is equally applicable here. Placing the means for
proportional representation in the hands of minorities should be a remedy for past
disfranchisement only when refranchisement has not resulted in the achievement of
meaningful political participation.
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In summary, section 2 should be reviewed as a viable alternative
to the constitutional dilution suit.
CONCLUSION
So, what can one say to Congress about the need for additional
protection of minority voting rights beyond that provided by the
Constitution and the permanent provisions of the Voting Rights
Act?
First, the figures on black elected officials in Part II, while cer-
tainly not conclusive, suggest that black political participation is still
depressed in some of the regions subject to the Act's special provi-
sions. In fact, the figures are probably too optimistic because they
deal solely with municipalities. Other studies of county and state
governments find evidence of even less black participation. If Con-
gress is concerned about genuine political participation, the words of
Howard Glickstein are as appropriate today as they were when, as
director of the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights, he testified in
the 1975 extension hearings: "When black voting 'power is evaluated
not for its news worthiness but in the more realistic light of black.
participation and power in the political system ... blacks have made
only a start toward full political equality." '355 Criticisms of Rome
aside, extension of section 5 will decrease the possibility that the
progress made will be wiped out by neutral election law changes.
Second, after Mobile, the Constitution provides little protection
for minorities from dilution caused by existing election systems. In a
sense, the Court is not protecting the first right of citizenship by
defining the right to vote without regard for the value of voting.
But, by this unnecessarily broad reading of section 5's "purpose or
effect standard" in Rome the Court has invited Congress to "fill the
gap."
Congress should accept the invitation by coming down clearly on
the side of the right to vote. That value comes not from proportional
representation, nor is it always assured by the right to cast a ballot.
Rather it comes from the ability to join together with others to
make one's numbers felt in the political process and, therefore, in
societal decision-making. It comes from being able to form alliances
to further common goals. It comes from being able to participate in
the "pluralist's bazaar" of politics. Congress can assure minorities
355. Howard A. Glickstein, Director for the Center for Civil Rights, University of
Notre Dame, in Hearings, supra note 342, at 215.
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they will receive the value of the right to vote by rejecting the ex-
tremes of both Mobile and of Rome. To do this they should define
"discriminatory effect" to reflect the right value-not balloting, not
proportional representation-but effective political participation.
Although this article argues that section 2 already provides this pro-
tection, Congress should not risk such precious rights on so slender
a reed. A clarifying amendment is advisable.
Perhaps the Supreme Court's reluctance to protect minorities
from the disproportionate impact of laws they had no part in making
and are powerless to change is justified. But when the Court does
not act to correct a denial of access to the law-making process itself,
it relegates minorities to permanent outside status-fully dependent
upon the benevolence of the majority. Congress should not make the
same mistake.
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Table B: Electing and Non Electing Municipalities



























TOTALS 335 (63.2%) 207 (36.8%) 562
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